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CONSTITUTIONAL ANOMALIES OR AS-
APPLIED CHALLENGES? A DEFENSE OF 
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS 
STEPHANIE H. BARCLAY* 
MARK L. RIENZI** 
Abstract: In the wake of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and now in anticipation of 
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., the notion that religious exemptions are 
dangerously out of step with norms of Constitutional jurisprudence has taken 
on a renewed popularity. Critics increasingly claim that religious exemptions, 
such as those available prior to Employment Division v. Smith and now availa-
ble under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), are a threat 
to basic fairness, equality, and the rule of law. Under this view, exemptions 
create an anomalous private right to ignore laws that everyone else must obey, 
and such a scheme will result in a tidal wave of religious claimants striking 
down government action. Our Article presents an observation that undermines 
these central criticisms. Far from being “anomalous” or “out of step” with our 
constitutional traditions, religious exemptions are just a form of “as-applied” 
challenges offered as a default remedy elsewhere in constitutional adjudica-
tion. Courts regularly provide exemptions from generally applicable laws for 
other First Amendment protected activity like expressive conduct that mirror 
the exemptions critics fear in the context of religious exercise. The Article al-
so presents original empirical analysis, including a national survey of all fed-
eral RFRA cases since Hobby Lobby, indicating that concerns of critics about 
religious exemptions have not been borne out as an empirical matter. Our 
findings suggest that even after Hobby Lobby, cases dealing with religious ex-
emption requests remain much less common than cases dealing with other ex-
pressive claims, and are less likely to result in invalidation of government ac-
tions. Thus, far from creating anomalous preferential treatment that threatens 
the rule of law, a religious exemption framework simply offers a similar level 
of protection courts have long provided for dissenting minority rights housed 
elsewhere in the First Amendment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Religious exemptions create an “anomaly” within our legal system—
an unfair special privilege to ignore the laws everyone else must obey.1 
Worse still, protecting the rights of diverse religious claimants in our nation 
will “be courting anarchy” by turning our law into “swiss cheese” and invit-
ing a tidal wave of litigation.2 
So goes one of the most common refrains raised by critics of religious 
exemptions. Some prominent free exercise cases have traded on these as-
sumptions, most notably the famous and controversial case of Employment 
Division v. Smith.3 Many of the recent criticisms of religious exemptions 
rely on these assumptions, both in the context of exemptions offered consti-
tutionally or statutorily through laws such as the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act (“RFRA”).4 And these arguments are being made with increasing 
frequency and volume in the wake of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,5 
and now in anticipation of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission.6 But are these arguments really accurate? 
A closer look at religious exemptions cases—particularly in compari-
son with other types of First Amendment cases—shows that the claim of 
unfair favoritism is not correct. This Article presents the claim that religious 
exemption requests are just a version of what is generally thought of as one 
of the most common, modest, and preferred modes of constitutional adjudi-
cation: the as-applied challenge. This is true regardless of whether the reli-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990); see also Mary Anne 
Case, Why “Live-and-Let-Live” Is Not a Viable Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious 
Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, 469, 471 (2015) (argu-
ing that Employment Division v. Smith was correctly decided, and that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) both causes problems of administrability for religious exemptions and 
results in problematic preferential treatment of some types of religious claims). 
 2 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888; JOHN CORVINO ET AL., DEBATING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND DIS-
CRIMINATION 52 (2017); see also infra notes 71–92 (surveying arguments of critics); infra notes 
267–303 and accompanying text (reviewing empirical analysis of religious exemption cases). 
 3 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886; see also Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: 
Toward a Unified Theory of First Amendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applica-
bility, 66 MO. L. REV. 9, 11 (2001) (“explor[ing] the extent to which the Constitution requires 
exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability in order to protect the free exercise of reli-
gion”); Kenneth Marin, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Alters the State of 
Free Exercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1433–75 (1991) (surveying the historical devel-
opment of free exercise jurisprudence). See generally Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 
(1878) (concluding that allowing religious exemptions would result in a “[g]overnment . . . only in 
name”). 
 4 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012). 
 5 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 6 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 280–81 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. denied 
sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 2015SC738, 2016 WL 
1645027 (Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (mem.). 
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gious exemptions are offered constitutionally or through statutes such as 
RFRA. Furthermore, under this form of as-applied adjudication, courts reg-
ularly provide identical exemptions in the context of expressive conduct 
that critics fear in the context of religious exercise protections. 
For example, in religious exemption cases, as in other expressive con-
duct as-applied challenges, the decision-maker is asked to find that a consti-
tutional right would be infringed by a particular application of an otherwise 
valid law not specifically aimed at protected activity. The remedy in both 
contexts is a court order protecting the exercise of the constitutional right, 
but otherwise leaving the law in place to apply to other circumstances that 
may arise. In fact, the aspect of religious exemptions that generates most of 
the criticism—the limited carve-out from a law that otherwise remains in 
place to apply to others—has been widely praised elsewhere as making as-
applied challenges preferable to more aggressive constitutional remedies, 
such as facial invalidation.7 
Furthermore, there are deep structural similarities between the as-
applied challenges in the expressive realm and the religious exercise realm. 
Thus, far from being problematic anomalies “in tension with other constitu-
tional principles,” the Supreme Court has described limited carve-outs as 
“the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication.”8 When religious 
exemption requests are properly understood as as-applied challenges, they 
actually look quite pedestrian, particularly in comparison to how constitu-
tional challenges work to protect other First Amendment interests.9 
But what about the concern that providing religious exemptions will 
result in our society “courting anarchy?” Is there something uniquely perva-
sive and dangerous about religious exemption requests? Is it true that the 
diverse religious views in our country mean we will face an “endless chain 
of exemption demands” that are much more expansive than other types of 
First Amendment activity?10 And particularly in the wake of Hobby Lobby, 
will we face a tidal wave of litigation by an endless line of religious objec-
tors who then become a law unto themselves and strike down government 
action at every turn? 
                                                                                                                           
 7 Of course, not all religious liberty claims are exemption requests. Some religious liberty 
claims seek to strike down laws on their face, including under the Establishment Clause or if the 
law engages in facial targeting under the Free Exercise Clause. Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 526, 531–32 (1993) (holding invalid a law restricting the San-
teria religious ritual of animal sacrifice); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 580–81 (1987) 
(holding facially invalid a law requiring teaching “creation sciences” because it lacked a “clear 
secular purpose”). 
 8 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007); William P. Marshall, Bad Statutes Make 
Bad Law: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74. 
 9 See infra notes 267–303 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 152–178 and accompanying text. 
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Our original empirical analysis suggests otherwise.11 The data suggests 
that expressive claims are much more pervasive than religious claims, both 
in absolute terms and as a percentage of all reported cases. We also provide 
a new survey of all federal RFRA decisions since Hobby Lobby, which ana-
lyzes how the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby impacted win 
rates of reported religious exercise cases. The data does not demonstrate a 
dramatic increase in the win rate of religious exercise litigants under RFRA. 
This may be explained, in part, because there are important legal limitations 
on successful religious claims, like the requirement of sincerity. 
So what explains the treatment we give to religious exemptions com-
pared to other First Amendment exemptions? One clue likely comes from the 
divergent 1940s cases of Minersville School District v. Gobitis and West Vir-
ginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.12 It may be that the Supreme 
Court’s embrace of a majoritarian approach to religious exercise in Gobitis 
(as later affirmed by Smith) leads critics of religious exemptions to view reli-
gious exercise rights more skeptically, even though neither the jurisprudential 
comparison to similar rights nor the empirical data justify such differential 
criticism and alarm. In fact, the Court firmly rejected the Gobitis approach 
under Barnette, and instead opted for a strong counter-majoritarian frame-
work for expressive rights.13 Viewed in this context, a religious exemption 
scheme such as RFRA is simply a restoration of a pluralistic protection of 
dissenting rights through as-applied challenges. 
Part I of this Article surveys scholarly criticisms of religious exemp-
tions as a threat to equality and the rule of law.14 Part II sets forth an alter-
nate view of religious exemptions as narrow, as-applied challenges that are 
elsewhere viewed as the preferred mode of constitutional adjudication. This 
Part explores how in the particularly relevant comparator context of com-
pelled speech, courts regularly provide exemptions from generally applica-
ble laws that mirror the exemptions critics fear in the context of religious 
exercise.15 Part III discusses the authors’ original empirical analysis of reli-
gious versus speech claims to illustrate that, contrary to scholarly apprehen-
sion, Hobby Lobby has not had a dramatic effect on government win rates in 
religious exemption challenges, nor have religious claims undergone a dra-
matic expansion in volume following Hobby Lobby. If anything, the volume 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See infra notes 267–289 and accompanying text. 
 12 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640–42 (1943) (holding that compel-
ling students to salute the flag and say the pledge of allegiance, despite their religious objections, 
violated their First Amendment rights); Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 
586, 598–600 (1940) (holding constitutional a compulsory flag salute in school), overruled by 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. 
 13 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641. 
 14 See infra notes 17–67 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 68–232 and accompanying text. 
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of these cases appears to be slightly decreasing as a percentage of all re-
ported cases.16 
I. THE CRITICISM OF RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS AS  
ANOMALOUS AND DANGEROUS 
A. Smith and Initial Backlash 
Critics of religious exemptions frequently rely on Justice Antonin Scal-
ia’s majority opinion in Smith.17 There, the Supreme Court rejected the no-
tion that the Free Exercise Clause requires religious exemptions from gen-
erally applicable and neutral laws.18 To overrule prior precedent that favored 
such exemptions, Justice Scalia relied on two justifications that remain in-
fluential among modern critics of religious exemptions: (1) religious ex-
emptions allow objectors to unfairly avoid compliance with an otherwise 
valid law, and (2) allowing exemptions in our radically diverse society 
would court anarchy.19 
First, Justice Scalia argued that religious exemptions were tantamount 
to “a private right to ignore generally applicable laws,” which would result 
in “a constitutional anomaly.”20 A person’s religious views, Justice Scalia 
explained, do not “excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law 
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”21 Viewing exemptions 
through this lens, Justice Scalia framed the issue in the case as “decid[ing] 
whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits the State 
of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its 
general criminal prohibition on use of that drug . . . .”22 This issue arose in 
the context of a state’s decision to deny unemployment benefits to a Native 
American person fired for violating a state prohibition on the use of peyote, 
even though the use of the drug was part of a religious ritual. Justice Scalia 
argued that the “government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohi-
bitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects 
of public policy, ‘cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental 
action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.’”23 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See infra notes 233–341 and accompanying text. 
 17 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874, 878–89. 
 18 Id. at 882. The Supreme Court has since whittled away at this principle from Smith. See, 
e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188–90 (2012) 
(recognizing an exemption from the generally applicable Americans with Disabilities Act). 
  19 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, 888. 
 20 Id. at 886. 
 21 Id. at 878–79. 
 22 Id. at 874. 
 23 Id. at 885 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 
(1988)). 
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Justice Scalia even went so far as to argue that valid, generally appli-
cable laws that did not target religion could not really burden religious ex-
ercise. He noted that the Free Exercise Clause would certainly prohibit a 
law that specifically targeted a religious group or practice, by doing things 
like banning statues used for worship purposes.24 But it would be quite an-
other thing, he argued, for the Free Exercise Clause to create an exemption 
from a law that was not “specifically directed at their religious practice” and 
when the law is otherwise constitutional when applied to others who engage 
in the practice for non-religious reasons.25 A generally applicable and neu-
tral law, according to Justice Scalia, could no more burden religious exer-
cise than it could “abridg[e] the freedom . . . of the press” if the law does 
not target such constitutional activity; instead, the burden on them is an “in-
cidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision.”26 
Justice Scalia thus explained that heightened scrutiny was “inapplicable” to 
a challenge to “an across-the-board . . . prohibition on a particular form of 
conduct.”27 
In a portion of the opinion addressing the tension this approach created 
with existing law, Justice Scalia acknowledged several court decisions in 
other constitutional contexts. This included speech, press, and association 
cases where the “First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally 
applicable law to religiously motivated action,” or else “compelled expres-
sion” that implicates religious freedom.28 In an attempt to distinguish these 
cases, Justice Scalia developed his hybrid rights theory and observed that 
these cases involved free exercise claims alongside other constitutional 
rights, or else were based solely upon freedom of speech.29 Justice Scalia 
also argued that employing heightened scrutiny “before the government 
may regulate the content of speech . . . is not remotely comparable to using 
it for” religious exemptions.30 He argued that heightened scrutiny in the 
speech context, which allows the “unrestricted flow of contending speech,” 
is merely a constitutional norm, whereas a religious exemption would result 
in a constitutionally anomalous “private right to ignore generally applicable 
laws. . . .”31 
Second, Justice Scalia argued that religious exemptions are particularly 
problematic in “a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Id. at 877–78. 
 25 Id. at 878. 
 26 Id.  
 27 Id. at 884–85. 
 28 Id. at 881–82. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 886. 
 31 Id. 
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conceivable religious preference,” and this “danger increases in direct pro-
portion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs.”32 “[W]e cannot afford 
the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious ob-
jector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the 
highest order,” he explained.33 Applying heightened scrutiny for such “reli-
gious divergence” would “open the prospect of constitutionally required 
religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable 
kind.”34 Some of the contexts Justice Scalia used as examples where prob-
lematic exemptions could be requested included drug laws, traffic laws, or 
animal cruelty laws.35 Thus, in the view of Justice Scalia, “adopting such a 
system would be courting anarchy.”36 
Justice Scalia acknowledged that other First Amendment rights, like 
free speech and press, sometimes bar “application of a neutral, generally 
applicable law to religiously motivated action.”37 But although he explained 
descriptively this difference between religious and other First Amendment 
rights under his regime, he never justified normatively why this distinction 
between religious exercise and other First Amendment rights should exist. 
When the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith was handed down, it re-
ceived widespread criticism. One scholar noted that in academia generally, 
“criticism of Smith . . . has become commonplace.”38 The criticism was not 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Id. at 888 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 889. 
 36 Id. at 888. 
 37 Id. at 881. 
 38 See Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-
Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259, 260 n.9 (collecting sources that discuss potential implications 
of Smith); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559 (1993) 
(Souter, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment) (noting that there are doubts as to 
whether “the Smith rule merits adherence”); Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live 
Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
850, 851–56 (2001) (arguing that despite the conclusion and subsequent criticism of Smith free 
exercise is still “alive and well”); James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 
CALIF. L. REV. 91, 114 (1991) (“What is there to admire [about Smith]? The Court wanted to 
reach its result in the worst way, and it succeeded.”); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free 
Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2–3 (arguing that Smith was incorrectly decided based on prece-
dent and original intent); Marin, supra note 3, at 1475–76 (1991) (arguing that “the Smith Court 
has rendered the free exercise clause impotent”); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revision-
ism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1990) (“There are many ways in 
which to criticize the Smith decision. . . . Smith is contrary to the deep logic of the First Amend-
ment.”); Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 11–26 (1991) (critiquing Justice Antonin Scalia’s use of history and precedent 
in the Smith decision); Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil Is in the Details: Neutral, Generally 
Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2000) (arguing that 
“[Smith] was not well crafted and was based on a mischaracterization of precedent”); Mark J. 
Rosen, Comment, Native Americans May Be Denied State Unemployment Benefits for Ceremonial 
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limited to academia—religious, political, and civil rights leaders also joined 
in from across the political spectrum, with Ted Kennedy, Bill Clinton, and 
the ACLU joining forces with Orrin Hatch and the United States Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops in efforts to repair what they saw as damage done 
by Smith.39 
This backlash resulted in the nearly unanimous passage of RFRA to re-
instate a religious exemption framework.40 When RFRA was passed in 1993, 
the bill was supported by one of the broadest bipartisan coalitions in recent 
political history, with sixty-six religious and civil liberties groups, including 
Muslims, Sikhs, Humanists, and secular civil liberties organizations such as 
the ACLU and Americans United for Separation of Church and State.41 
B. Smith’s Academic Resurgence 
In light of recent hot-button religious exemption cases like Hobby 
Lobby,42 and now Masterpiece Cakeshop,43 legal academic support for 
                                                                                                                           
Ingestion of Peyote Without Violating First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 
209, 230 (1991) (arguing that “[t]he Court’s cursory disregard for precedent in arriving at its hold-
ing suggests the Court’s willingness to forego long-standing doctrinal jurisprudence, and substi-
tute its new, stultified vision of the Free Exercise liberties ‘protected’ by the Constitution”); Whit-
ney Travis, Note, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Smith: Dueling Levels of Constitu-
tional Scrutiny, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1701, 1707 (2007) (noting that “Smith was met with 
enormous criticism”). To be sure, Smith did have some contemporaneous academic defenders. 
See, e.g., Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical 
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916 (1992) (questioning the originalist historical evi-
dence in favor of religious exemptions); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exer-
cise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 309 (1991) (defending “Smith’s rejection of constitu-
tionally compelled free exercise exemptions without defending Smith itself”). 
 39 See Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 784 
(2015) (“Given the politics currently surrounding RFRA, it should come as little surprise that 
many religious organizations objected to the decision in Smith. It is more surprising that many 
liberal civil rights organizations objected as well—the ACLU, Americans United for the Separa-
tion of Church and State, People for the American Way, and Americans for Democratic Action 
came together in a powerful coalition that proposed a statutory overturning of Smith. . . . Thus, at 
the Court, in Congress, and in the White House, a large number of liberals supported the principle 
of religious liberty embodied in RFRA.”). 
 40 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012); Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210, 243–44 (1994); Ira C. Lupu, The Fail-
ure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 588 (1998) (noting that “RFRA is federal law, 
supported by a near unanimous House and Senate and an enthusiastic President”); Travis, supra 
note 38, at 1707 (noting that “[i]n direct response to Smith, Congress passed the RFRA in 1993 
with nearly unanimous support in both the House and the Senate”). 
 41 Laycock & Thomas, supra note 40, at 210 n.9; Travis Gasper, Comment, A Religious Right 
to Discriminate: Hobby Lobby and “Religious Freedom” as a Threat to the LGBT Community, 3 
TEX. A&M L. REV. 395, 416 (2015) (noting that “the groups most active in pushing for passage of 
the 1993 RFRA were ideologically left of center”). 
 42 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 43 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 280–81 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. denied 
sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 2015SC738, 2016 WL 
1604 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1595 
RFRA has declined, while the once-maligned reasoning of Smith has recent-
ly resurfaced. As many commentators have observed, “the space for ac-
commodating religious objections to general legal obligations is increasing-
ly contested in contemporary American legal, political, and ethical dis-
course.”44 In particular, the question of whether “demands for exemptions 
from generally applicable laws” are justified is “an issue that has recently 
assumed increased significance . . . .”45 
For example, in the wake of recent RFRA cases, one scholar recently 
advanced “the normative view that Smith was correctly decided and that . . . 
[RFRA] was a mistake.”46 Another argued that “Smith was decided the way 
it was for a reason.”47 Another defended the principal holding of Smith that 
when you have “a neutral state law that applies to everyone,” this law 
should apply to all without religious exceptions.48 And still another argued 
that Justice Scalia correctly decided Smith in holding that “[r]eligion is not a 
get-out-of-the-law-free-card.”49 Notably, most of these critics do not object 
in principle to protecting religious liberty; rather, the objections of critics 
generally boil down to the same two primary arguments Justice Scalia relied 
on in Smith. 
First, critics argue that religious exemptions from otherwise valid laws 
provide an anomalous remedy—essentially an excuse to avoid obeying the 
                                                                                                                           
1645027 (Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (mem.). 
 44 Hillel Y. Levin et al., To Accommodate or Not to Accommodate: (When) Should the State 
Regulate Religion to Protect the Rights of Children and Third Parties?, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
915, 918 (2016); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for Hobby Lobby: Improbable 
Alternatives, Truly Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee Burdens, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 
153, 176 (2015) (expressing concern about Burwell v. Hobby Lobby’s “unprecedented expansion 
of permissive accommodation” as an “‘opt-out’ from generally applicable legislation”); Paul 
Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 170 (2014) (arguing that “[a] sub-
stantial body of opinion on this issue has moved from the view that Smith erred grievously by 
rejecting the prior regime of free exercise exemptions from generally applicable law, . . . to a 
broader questioning of religious accommodations altogether”); Maimon Schwarzschild, Do Reli-
gious Exemptions Save?, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 185, 187 (2016) (“[S]upport for religious exemp-
tions may now be breaking down along ideological-political lines. . . . [O]utright opposition to the 
idea of religious exemption was uncommonly met with until very recently, either in politics or in 
the legal literature.”); Elizabeth Sepper, Reports of Accommodation’s Death Have Been Greatly 
Exaggerated, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 24, 24 (2014), http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/vol_128_Sepper.pdf [https://perma.cc/4W9U-DKWT] (claiming a grow-
ing consensus “against granting religious exemptions from generally applicable laws”). 
 45 Laura M. Weinrib, Freedom of Conscience in War Time: World War I and the Limits of 
Civil Liberties, 65 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1054 (2016). 
 46 Case, supra note 1, at 469. 
 47 Marshall, supra note 8, at 74. 
 48 Haley Gray, What You Need to Know About the Masterpiece Cakeshop Case, 5280: DENVER 
MAG. (June 28, 2017), http://www.5280.com/2017/06/what-you-need-to-know-about-masterpiece-
cakeshop-v-colorado-civil-rights-commission/ [https://perma.cc/FYJ6-T94Z]. 
 49 CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 31. 
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laws that apply to everyone else. They have been described as “a troubling 
form of relief—special exemptions from neutral laws for a limited class of 
beneficiaries—that is in tension with other constitutional principles,” or as 
not “in the tradition of American liberty.”50 Under this view, exemptions are 
problematic because they allow religious objectors to avoid “play[ing] by 
the same rules as everyone else.”51 Thus, if a given law is justified at all, 
then the law ought to be applied consistently.52 Offering exemptions, one 
scholar argues, would “result in a kind of ‘Swiss cheese’ law.”53 Professor 
Frederick Gedicks asserts that RFRA defies common sense and the constitu-
tion by giving religious believers “a free pass to ignore laws that bind eve-
ryone else.”54 Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle similarly argue that 
extending “strict, rights-protective review to laws that imposed an inci-
dental burden on religious experience thus elevated religious freedom to a 
preferred position among First Amendment rights, rather than assimilating 
the Free Exercise Clause with its counterpart rights of speech and press.”55 
The view that religious exemptions are anomalous quickly leads to the 
conclusion that recipients of such exemptions are getting preferential treat-
ment under the law, or as one scholar asserted, “disconcerting favoritism” 
for religious objectors.56 Some raise concerns that religious accommoda-
tions would result in particularly problematic special treatment in the con-
text of anti-discrimination laws, including the public accommodation laws 
at issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop.57 Other scholars echo these allegations of 
special privilege for religion under a religious accommodation scheme.58 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Case, supra note 1, at 469–70 (noting that “the sorts of religious exemptions from generally 
applicable laws typically proposed by proponents of a live-and-let-live solution to the sexual cul-
ture wars are neither workable nor in the tradition of American liberty” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Marshall, supra note 8, at 74; see also Dan T. Coenen, Free Speech and Generally 
Applicable Laws: A New Doctrinal Synthesis, 103 IOWA L. REV. 435, 466 (2018) (“[S]ingling out 
religious practitioners for special treatment in applying generally applicable laws creates a tension 
with the constitutional norm, rooted largely in the Establishment Clause, of ensuring the state’s 
complete neutrality toward religion. Stated another way, exempting members of particular reli-
gious traditions from laws that apply to everyone else smacks of advantaging both religion in 
general and some religions over others.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 51 CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 22. 
 52 Id. at 22, 31. 
 53 Id. at 52. 
 54 Frederick Mark Gedicks, Is Religion an Excuse for Breaking the Law?, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 12, 
2016, 10:51 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/are-religious-beliefs-excuse-breaking-law-435664 
[https://perma.cc/R54Y-XEM4].  
 55 IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT: RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 11–12 
(2014). 
 56 Marshall, supra note 8, at 74; see also Case, supra note 1, at 486–87 (raising concerns 
about the risk of “unconstitutional favoritism implicit in proposals for special religious accommo-
dations”). 
 57 See generally MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF EXTREME RELI-
GIOUS LIBERTY (2d rev. ed. 2014) (discussing the problems inherent to “extreme” legal protec-
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Second, critics argue that religious accommodations are uniquely per-
vasive, such that they deteriorate the rule of law and risk anarchy, particu-
larly post Hobby Lobby. In this vein, Professor Case argues that Hobby 
Lobby has “open[ed] up the floodgates to a host of new potential claims for 
religious exemption by a host of different kinds of service providers.”59 Pro-
fessor Leslie Griffin argues that because of Hobby Lobby, the “broad read-
ing of RFRA . . . will encourage many future lawsuits and undermine more 
civil liberties.”60 She also asserted that “[a]lmost anything can be turned 
into a claim of ‘cooperation with evil’” and “all federal laws are now sub-
ject to challenge, with the possibility of every citizen becoming ‘a law unto 
himself’ until the rule of law is undermined.”61 Professor Elizabeth Sepper 
                                                                                                                           
tions for religious freedom, starting with RFRA and its offshoots); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 
1238–40 (2014); Case, supra note 1, at 485 (noting that “[a]dvocates of exemptions from public 
accommodation laws for service providers who refuse to provide flowers or cake for same-sex 
wedding celebrations have yet to explain whether and why the claims of these Christian bakers 
and florists are more worthy of accommodation” than other groups); Lucien J. Dhooge, Public 
Accommodation Statutes, Sexual Orientation and Religious Liberty: Free Access or Free Exer-
cise?, 27 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 58 (2016) (arguing that “any conflicts between religious 
liberty asserted by secular businesses and access to goods and services must be resolved in favor 
of the government’s compelling interest in guaranteeing full and non-discriminatory access for all 
persons,” and that this “result does not denigrate religion”) (internal footnote omitted); Martin S. 
Lederman, Reconstructing RFRA: The Contested Legacy of Religious Freedom Restoration, 125 
YALE L.J. F. 416, 419 (2016), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Lederman_PDF_pt9q3ynr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R72J-26CV] (arguing that “there is widespread fear in some quarters—and pre-
sumably hope in others—that such claims might become a template for similar claims, pursuant to 
federal or state RFRAs or analogous state constitutional provisions, for religious exemptions from 
laws that prohibit discrimination in employment, or in the provision of public accommodations, on 
the basis of sexual orientation”); Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-
Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2561–64 (2015) (noting 
concern that religious exemptions could be granted from public accommodations laws through 
“complicity-based conscience claims”); Leslie C. Griffin, If Conestoga Wins, Watch Out Civil Rights, 
HAMILTON & GRIFFIN ON RIGHTS (Mar. 24, 2014), http://hamilton-griffin.com/if-conestoga-wins-
watch-out-civil-rights/ [https://perma.cc/JBR8-GFVA]. But see Sepper, supra note 44, at 26 (noting 
that “[p]ublic accommodations laws generally apply with full force to all businesses serving the 
public, religiously affiliated or not”). 
 58 See Michele Goodwin & Allison M. Whelan, Constitutional Exceptionalism, 2016 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1287, 1329 (arguing that religious accommodations result in a religious “exceptionalism” 
where “‘religiously based rights’ trump all other constitutionally derived interests” and result in 
“problematic norms”); Schwarzschild, supra note 44, at 199 (noting that “exemptions and ac-
commodations puts religious people in the invidious position of demanding special privileges” 
that is particularly troubling “in an egalitarian society, where a core idea is rejection of special 
privilege”). 
 59 Case, supra note 1, at 469, 487. 
 60 Leslie C. Griffin, Hobby Lobby: The Crafty Case That Threatens Women’s Rights and 
Religious Freedom, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 641, 673 (2015). 
 61 Id. at 687–88; see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Religion Is Not a Basis 
for Harming Others: Review Essay of Paul A. Offit’s Bad Faith: When Religious Belief Under-
mines Modern Medicine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1111, 1133–34 (2016) (“This decision will lead to much 
broader challenges. Christian Scientists, for example, will claim that they do not have to provide 
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argues that “[t]he Hobby Lobby decision throws open the courtroom door to 
corporations and hands them the now-powerful weapon of corporate con-
science to fight off regulation that protects the full and equal citizenship of 
the people.”62 Professor Corvino raises concerns that the religious activities 
that receive protection for “exemption and accommodation purposes are 
expansive and expanding” as a result of Hobby Lobby.63 Corvino explains 
that the “pervasiveness” and “endless variety of religious scruples,” provide 
a strong motive not to have an extensive “exemption regime.”64 Thus, Cor-
vino concludes that it is “precisely for that reason that Justice Scalia opined 
[in Smith] that, in a religiously diverse nation, any system requiring strict 
scrutiny for laws burdening religious beliefs is ‘courting anarchy.’”65 Pro-
fessor Lupu has argued that “a general regime of judicial exemptions is a 
lawless, sometimes unconstitutional, and pervasively unprincipled cha-
rade.”66 Numerous others have expressed similar administration concerns.67 
                                                                                                                           
any health insurance to their employees.”); Alan E. Garfield, And the Wall Comes Tumbling 
Down: How the Supreme Court Is Striking the Wrong Balance Between Majority and Minority 
Rights in Church-and-State Cases, 68 ARK. L. REV. 789, 825 (2015) (arguing that “[b]y tipping 
the scales so drastically in favor of religious objectors, Justice Alito put out a welcome mat for 
religious objections by corporations”); Christopher T. Robertson, Vaccines and Airline Travel: A 
Federal Role to Protect the Public Health, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 543, 569 (2016) (arguing that “the 
ruling casts a shadow over all public health regulation, given that virtually any objector can cloak 
their objection in religious garb”); Sarah M. Stephens, An Employer’s Conscience After Hobby 
Lobby and the Continuing Conflict Between Women’s Rights and Religious Freedom, 24 BUFF. J. 
GENDER, L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 4 (2016) (“The Court’s significant expansion of religious liberty 
doctrine in Hobby Lobby invites businesses to seek exemptions from nondiscrimination laws such 
as Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well 
as other laws, which provide workplace protections to women, such as the Family and Medical 
Leave Act[] . . . .”). 
 62 Elizabeth Sepper, Gendering Corporate Conscience, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 193, 233 
(2015). 
 63 CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 38. 
 64 Id. at 46, 47–50 (quoting BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 34 (2013)). 
 65 Id. at 37, 50; see also id. at 36–38; LEITER, supra note 64, at 34. 
 66 Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 35, 101 (2015). 
 67 Case, supra note 1, at 468, 469 (positing that Smith is sound jurisprudence “even if for no 
other reason, then because of the descriptive impracticability of an approach to religious exemp-
tions from generally applicable law”); Dhooge, supra note 57, at 54 (asserting that RFRA “opens 
the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost 
every conceivable kind,” and “[t]he impact of such an approach . . . contradicts constitutional 
tradition and common sense” (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted)); Marshall, supra 
note 8, at 130 (suggesting that providing religious accommodations under RFRA “will exacerbate 
the concerns inherent in a jurisprudence that the Court soundly rejected in Smith as both unworka-
ble and normatively unsound”). 
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II. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS UNDERSTOOD AS AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES 
The question of whether to provide as-applied exemptions from gener-
ally applicable laws can be seen as a broader political question about how 
our pluralistic society should treat dissenting views or practices. Should 
society generally demand conformity to general policies preferred by the 
majority, or should it take a “live and let live” approach by allowing minori-
ty and nonconformist groups and individuals to live their lives and order 
their communities as they see fit where possible?68 That longstanding de-
bate continues to rage in academia, and will for decades to come.69 But this 
Part illustrates that under Employment Division v. Smith’s framework, courts 
are likely to answer the question in favor of accommodating divergent mi-
nority positions when it comes to speech-based rights, but not religion.70 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Levin et al., supra note 44, at 925. 
 69 Some scholars note, “for those Progressives who had confronted the costs of countermajori-
tarian constitutionalism head on, there was ample reason to interrogate an extension of individual 
rights.” Weinrib, supra note 45, at 1136; see also Charles M. Freeland, The Political Process as 
Final Solution, 68 IND. L.J. 525, 526 n.11 (1993) (collecting sources and describing the school of 
thought viewing reliance on political process instead of robust bill of rights protections as the long 
awaited solution to the “countermajoritarian problem” that has plagued the “democracy as materi-
al equality”). Still other scholars recognize that robust individual freedoms are critical, even for a 
healthy democracy, and cannot merely be what is “left over” after the political process is com-
plete. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 196–201 (1989) (arguing that denying constitutional rights excludes certain groups from 
fully belonging to the American people); Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 
1409, 1412 (1991); see also Owen Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1117, 1118 (1991) 
(praising judicial protection of individual liberty against majoritarian will); Michael J. Klarman, 
Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 19 (1996) (pointing 
out that many scholars think Brown proves that courts are “countermajoritarian heroics” who 
protect minority rights); David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 8 (1999) (same); Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democra-
cy: What Role for the Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 637 (2003) (questioning whether 
the role of the judiciary in protecting entrenched human rights is appropriate); Jeremy Waldron, A 
Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18, 19–20 (1993) 
(questioning our deference to some rights in comparison to others); Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Judi-
cial Restraint of the Warren Court (and Why It Matters), 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 255, 259 n.13 (2008) 
(observing over 500 law review articles “written in the past twenty years advocating the proposi-
tion that courts should protect minorities against the will of the majority”). 
 70 See also Corinna Barrett Lain, Three Supreme Court “Failures” and a Story of Supreme 
Court Success, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1072 (2016) (“The Court’s self-conception of its role as a 
countermajoritarian protector has helped it stretch to its countermajoritarian limits, at least in cer-
tain contexts. Here, several of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment cases come to mind; its 
protection of flag burning, cross burning, and Ku Klux Klan rallies as freedom of expression are 
prime examples. . . . [M]uch work still needs to be done on why the Justices embrace their coun-
termajoritarian role in some contexts and not others.”). 
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A. As-Applied Challenges Such as Religious Exemptions Are the  
Preferred Mode of Constitutional Adjudication 
Relying on Smith, Professor Corvino argues that if a given law is justi-
fied at all, then the law ought to be applied “consistently.”71 Offering ex-
emptions, he argues, “result[s] in a kind of ‘Swiss cheese’ law.”72 Thus, if a 
law is facially valid, it ought to apply universally. As a result, Professor 
Corvino and others argue that a judgment that invalidates a law only in one 
circumstance, but leaves the law otherwise intact, creates an anomaly result-
ing in “special rights” for objectors “in tension with other constitutional 
principles.”73 
But such a judgment can be described in much more positive terms—
as a “modest,”74 “normal,”75 “surgical,”76 “narrow,”77 and “logically prima-
ry”78 method that comprise “the basic building blocks of constitutional ad-
judication.”79 These latter terms are precisely how both the Supreme Court 
and leading commentators describe as-applied adjudication. 
The Supreme Court has explained that “the normal rule is that partial, 
rather than facial, invalidation is the required course, such that a statute may 
be declared invalid to the extent that it reaches too far, but otherwise left 
                                                                                                                           
 71 CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 31. 
 72 Id. at 52. 
 73 Id.; Marshall, supra note 8, at 74; Schwarzschild, supra note 44, at 199; see also infra notes 
152–178 and accompany text.  
 74 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 331 (2006). 
 75 Id. at 329 (holding that “the ‘normal rule’ is that ‘partial, rather than facial, invalidation is 
the required course,’ such that a ‘statute may . . . be declared invalid to the extent that it reaches 
too far, but otherwise left intact’”) (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 
(1985)) (emendations in original). 
 76 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 
915, 956 (2011) (observing that as-applied challenges involve surgical severing); see also Wash. 
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 451 (2008) (asserting that “facial 
challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will 
of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution,” and that “a 
ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people” (al-
terations and quotation marks omitted)). 
 77 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460 (2011). 
 78 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1329, 1368 (2000) (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 5) (1960)); 
see also Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219–20 (1912) (hold-
ing that a statute that settles claims for “lost or damaged freight” was valid “as applied” to the 
facts before the court); Fallon, supra, at 1368 (“[A]s-applied challenges reflect entrenched though 
often unarticulated presuppositions that the full meaning of a statute frequently is not obvious on 
the occasion of its first application, but can be left to emerge through case-by-case specification; 
that familiar processes of interpretation characteristically treat statutes as comprising multiple 
subrules; and that any constitutionally invalid subrules through which a statute might be specified 
can ordinarily be separated from valid subrules.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 79 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007) (quotation marks omitted). 
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intact.”80 Thus, when examining a statute’s constitutionality the Court at-
tempts to narrow its holding to address the specific problem, or “to sever its 
problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact.”81 Such a principle 
flows from the “axiom[] that a ‘statute may be invalid as applied to one 
state of facts and yet valid as applied to another.”82 This approach also al-
lows the Court to address more concrete facts and to do the least damage to 
the rule of law as envisioned by the original drafters.83 As Justice Stevens 
put it, when the Court strikes down statutes facially, rather than as-applied, 
“[t]he Court operates with a sledge hammer rather than a scalpel.”84 
Many scholars also note the Roberts Court’s preference for as-applied 
challenges instead of facial ones.85 This preference has manifested itself in 
many different legal contexts, including “abortion rights, Congress’s en-
forcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and cam-
paign finance.”86 Professor Richard Fallon has explained that this jurispru-
dential preference for limited invalidations that leave a statute otherwise 
intact generally relies on a three-part rationale: (1) the constitutional princi-
ple of “avoiding unnecessary or premature decisions of constitutional is-
sues” where possible; (2) the fact that meanings of statutes are often best 
specified “through a series of fact-specific, case-by-case decisions”; and (3) 
the reality that constitutionally invalid applications of statutes often “could 
be severed or separated from valid ones.”87 Scholars disagree about the fre-
quency with which the Supreme Court actually employs as-applied versus 
facial analysis to strike down statutes, but there is little debate that as-
                                                                                                                           
 80 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 
 81 Id. at 328–29 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82 Id. at 329. 
 83 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608–09 (2004) (holding that “facial challenges are 
best when infrequent” because “[f]acial adjudication carries too much promise of ‘premature in-
terpretation of statutes’ on the basis of factually barebones records”) (quoting Raines, 362 U.S. at 
22) (emendations omitted); see also Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450–51 (holding that “facial 
challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process”). 
 84 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 399 (2010) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
 85 Luke Meier, Facial Challenges and Separation of Powers, 85 IND. L.J. 1557, 1557 n.3 
(2010) (citing David L. Franklin, Looking Through Both Ends of the Telescope: Facial Challenges 
and the Roberts Court, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 697 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s “as-applied” preference confirms its “fidelity to the traditional model”); Gillian E. Metz-
ger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773, 773 
(2009) (arguing that “[o]ne recurring theme of the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence to date is its 
resistance to facial constitutional challenges and preference for as-applied litigation”); Nicholas 
Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1233, 1239 (2010) 
(noting that “the Court insists that ‘as-applied’ challenges are the most common and preferred 
form of constitutional challenge”).  
 86 Metzger, supra note 85, at 776. 
 87 Fallon, supra note 78, at 1330–31. 
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applied invalidation of laws generally involves a “surgical severing” of con-
stitutionally infirm aspects of the rule.88 
What has generally gone unnoticed is that judicially-created religious 
exemptions are functionally a species of as-applied adjudication. This is true 
regardless of whether the exemption results from litigation brought under 
constitutional free exercise grounds or statutory grounds (such as RFRA). In 
both instances, the decision-maker must determine whether a constitutional 
right would be infringed by a particular application of an otherwise valid 
law. And in both instances, the court will order a remedy that protects the 
exercise of the constitutional right, but otherwise leaves the law in place to 
apply to other circumstances that may arise. After Smith, it is much more 
difficult to obtain successful religious exemptions as a constitutional matter 
in many contexts. Viewed in this light, RFRA is essentially restoring a 
standard that again allows for as-applied challenges to otherwise valid laws. 
For example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby held that 
the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) contraception 
mandate unjustifiably burdened a family-held business’s religious exercise 
because the government had many other alternatives to accomplish its inter-
est of making contraception more accessible to women.89 The Court there-
fore held that RFRA required “an exemption from the rule.”90 But the Court 
did not strike down the HHS mandate wholesale. Thus, this law continues 
to apply to all other covered employers, but with surgical exemptions for a 
limited group of religious objectors. 
Courts have engaged in this same type of adjudication in other suc-
cessful challenges under RFRA and the Religious Land Use and Institution-
alized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). For example, in 2006, in Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, the Court held that the Con-
trolled Substances Act, although generally constitutional, could not be ap-
plied to prohibit the sacramental use of hoasca tea for a religious group.91 
And in 2015, in Holt v. Hobbs, the Court concluded that the prison’s ban on 
beards, although generally valid, could not be applied to prohibit certain 
religiously-motivated beards.92 In each case, the Court required an excep-
tion to an otherwise valid law to protect a religious exercise right. 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 76, at 956 (explaining that as-applied challenges involve the 
surgical severing of problematic aspects of a statute from acceptable applications). 
 89 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760, 2780–82 (2014). 
 90 Id. at 2761. 
 91 546 U.S. 418, 438–39 (2006). 
 92 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015). 
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B. Survey of First Amendment As-Applied Challenges 
Of course, the fact that religious exemptions are functionally as-
applied challenges does not answer whether those sorts of as-applied chal-
lenges still result in unfair preferential treatment for religious liberty claims 
if they are offered to facially valid and generally applicable laws. As-
applied challenges in other First Amendment contexts provide a particularly 
relevant comparator to assess that question. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause 
embraces a freedom of conscience and worship that has close parallels in 
the speech provisions of the First Amendment . . . .”93 Free exercise protec-
tions and free speech protections theoretically serve many similar roles in 
our constitutional democracy: they both operate as important safeguards 
against government overreach, implicate matters of personal choice and 
identity, allow for robust pluralism in our diverse society, help curb dissen-
sion and social conflict, and protect minority rights that will not necessarily 
be addressed through the political process.94 As one notable academic has 
observed regarding free exercise compared to other constitutional rights, “it 
seems intuitively correct that similar rights should be enforced to a similar 
extent with similar doctrine.”95 
Prior to Smith, in a number of constitutional cases the Supreme Court 
did enforce the First Amendment rights of speech and religious exercise 
quite similarly. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, for example, a city had a gen-
erally applicable ordinance that required “all persons canvassing for or so-
liciting . . . goods, paintings, pictures, wares, or merchandise of any kind” to 
pay a fee to the city to obtain a license to solicit.96 Plaintiffs who had been 
arrested under this ordinance were Jehovah’s Witnesses going door to door 
distributing religious literature and soliciting donations without ever obtain-
ing such a license.97 The Plaintiffs argued this government action “deprived 
them of the freedom of speech, press, and religion guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.”98 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992) (emphasis added). 
 94 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 167–68 (2016) (arguing 
that enumerated rights like freedom of speech and religious exercise are like “lifeboats” on a sink-
ing ship; the last defense for retained individual rights when structural protections fail); Steven D. 
Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
149, 196–98 (1991) (discussing historic rationales for religious freedom). 
 95 Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 
IND. L.J. 77, 120–22 (2000). But see Coenen, supra note 50, at 467 (arguing that different treat-
ment of speech and religious exercise exemptions is warranted because speech and religious exer-
cise rights “serve different purposes within our constitutional system”). 
 96 319 U.S. 105, 106 (1943). 
 97 Id. at 106–07. 
 98 Id. at 107. 
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In addressing these claims, the Supreme Court first made clear that the 
ordinance at issue in this case was facially valid.99 Further, the Court ob-
served that the regulation did not discriminate.100 Thus, the limited question 
before the Court was simply whether the ordinance “as construed and ap-
plied require[d] religious colporteurs to pay a license tax as a condition to 
the pursuit of their activities.”101 
The Court rejected the government’s argument that providing an ex-
emption would put Jehovah’s Witnesses “above the law.”102 Instead, it ex-
plained, “[a] license tax certainly does not acquire constitutional validity 
because it classifies the privileges protected by the First Amendment along 
with the wares and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them 
all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the ordinance.”103 Just 
because a law is facially valid does not mean it can be validly enforced 
when it butts up against fundamental constitutional rights. At that point, an 
ordinance “is not directed to the problems with which the police power of 
the state is free to deal.”104 This is because, as the Court noted, “[f]reedom 
of press, freedom of speech, [and] freedom of religion are in a preferred 
position.”105 The Murdock Court thus held that the ordinance’s application 
here both curtailed the free press and impinged freedom of religion, and that 
these rights “stand or fall together.”106 
As-applied challenges brought under other speech-based claims still 
receive fairly similar treatment to that provided under Murdock.107 But after 
Smith, and under the scheme advocated by critics of religious exemptions, 
there are at least two contexts where as-applied speech challenges receive 
significantly different treatment than similar religious challenges: com-
pelled action and discretionary enforcement or application of a law. 
                                                                                                                           
 99 Id. at 110 (holding that there was no “question as to the validity of a registration system for 
colporteurs and other solicitors”). 
 100 Id. at 115. 
 101 Id. at 110. 
 102 Id. at 116 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 103 Id. at 115. 
 104 Id. at 116. 
 105 Id. at 115. 
 106 Id. at 117 (emphasis added). The Court arrived at a similar conclusion in several other 
cases dealing with religious solicitation. See, e.g., Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944) 
(holding that the application of a flat license tax was a violation of the free exercise clause); 
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414, 417 (1943) (holding that the law could not prohibit dissemi-
nation of religious handbills in the street); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304–07 (1940) 
(concluding that the application of a regulation that required a certificate in order to solicit support 
for a religion was a violation of the Constitution). 
 107 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943). 
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In these contexts, RFRA can be viewed as an attempt to functionally 
restore the as-applied standard that existed prior to Smith and that resembles 
First Amendment speech protections. 
1. Compelled Action 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the state had a neutral and generally applicable 
law that made school compulsory for students until the age of sixteen.108 
Based on their religious beliefs, Amish families refused to send their chil-
dren to public school after they completed eighth grade. The government 
refused to provide an exemption for these families, and it fined the families 
for failing to send their children to school.109 Plaintiffs offered evidence that 
the government’s refusal to provide an exemption would result in “destruc-
tion of the Old Order Amish church community as it exists in the United 
States today.”110 The Court noted that: 
to agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject 
to the broad police power of the State is not to deny that there are 
areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to con-
trol, even under regulations of general applicability.111 
The Court also reasoned that a facially neutral regulation could still violate 
the requirement that the Government remain neutral if it applies in a way 
that “unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”112 In this case, the Court 
held that the government failed to meet its burden under strict scrutiny and 
justify this religious burden. Thus, the Court provided an exemption.113 
Yoder was one of the cases Smith attempted to banish to the hybrid-
rights category.114 Professor Gedicks has argued that Smith replaced Yoder 
with a standard that “specifies that incidental burdens imposed by a law on 
religious practices are subject to rational basis scrutiny so long as the law is 
‘generally applicable.’”115 
                                                                                                                           
 108 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972). 
 109 Id. at 208. 
 110 Id. at 212. 
 111 Id. at 220. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 234–35. 
  114 See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (holding that 
“[t]he only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neu-
tral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise 
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections 
such as freedom of speech and of the press”). 
 115 Gedicks, supra note 95, at 91–94, 113 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 885–86). 
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The facts of Yoder, however, are remarkably similar to other free 
speech cases dealing with compelled expression that remain good law in the 
expressive constitutional realm. For example, the canonical compelled 
speech case of Wooley v. Maynard presents a good example of different 
treatment of free exercise versus speech rights when it comes to exemp-
tions.116 There, the plaintiff was a Jehovah’s Witness who challenged the 
application of New Hampshire’s law requiring the state motto of “Live Free 
or Die” on all state license plates.117 Consequences for violating this law 
included fines and even jail time.118 
The Court did not question the state’s ability to generally require driv-
ers to display the state motto.119 Rather, the Court analyzed whether the fa-
cially valid law could be applied to the parties in this case, or whether they 
were entitled to an exemption based on their disagreement with the message 
on the license plate.120 
Notably, the appellee’s disagreement with the state’s license plate mes-
sage was based on their sincere “religious objections to the motto.”121 As 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, they believed that they could not advertise the motto 
on their vehicles.122 Thus, their speech objection was coextensive with their 
religious objection. Had the claim been analyzed solely under the rational 
basis framework some modern scholars advocate as appropriate for reli-
gious exemptions, though, the holding of this case likely would have been 
that a person’s religion does not “excuse him from compliance with an oth-
erwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”123 
The religious beliefs here also implicated compelled speech, however, 
and the Court thus explained that the First Amendment protects the “right to 
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”124 The Court ap-
plied heightened scrutiny to determine that the State did not have an ade-
quately compelling interest to justify the requirement it had other, narrower 
means to accomplish the objective.125 As a result, the Court held that “the 
                                                                                                                           
 116 430 U.S. 705, 715–16 (1977). 
 117 Id. at 707. 
 118 Id. at 708–09. 
  119 Id. at 717. 
 120 Id. at 713, 717. 
 121 Id. at 708. 
 122 Id. at 707. 
 123 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79; see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1972). Of course, 
there is a possibility that a court would find the law in Wooley v. Maynard not to be generally 
applicable because of the exception for government vehicles. Id. at 707 n.1. But along those same 
lines, it could be argued that the law in Employment Division v. Smith likewise was not truly gen-
erally applicable, because it included an exception for the use of peyote that was “prescribed by a 
medical practitioner.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 124 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714–15. 
 125 Id. at 716. 
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State of New Hampshire may not require appellees to display the state mot-
to” and upheld the district court’s injunction protecting them from prosecu-
tion.126 The Court thus upheld an exemption from an otherwise facially val-
id law.127 
Wooley and Yoder are interesting comparators because both involve a 
government action that was not designed to target First Amendment activity, 
but both nonetheless compelled activity with serious expressive or religious 
implications. Wooley and its progeny also illustrate that in some instances a 
law is more likely to be deemed content based (or inappropriately targeted 
at protected conduct) and thus deserving of exacting scrutiny in the speech 
realm compared to the parallel finding of targeting in the religious realm.128 
No Smith defender would seriously argue that the license plate law in 
Wooley targeted Jehovah’s Witnesses either facially or intentionally.129 Nev-
ertheless, the law did target a certain type of action that the plaintiffs found 
objectionable for religious reasons.130 Under the Smith regime, the govern-
ment almost certainly would have received a free pass for this law’s “inci-
dental” burden on religious exercise.131 That is so even though the law 
would have also been compelling a type of action that had religious signifi-
cance to the plaintiffs. Under speech jurisprudence, the Court subjected the 
law to the most heightened form of constitutional scrutiny.132 Indeed, in the 
                                                                                                                           
 126 Id. at 717. The district court had entered an order enjoining the state “from arresting and 
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 127 See id. at 717. 
 128 To be sure, even the Court’s more generous approach to finding non-neutrality in the 
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Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the 
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 129 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
 130 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1972). 
 131 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
 132 See Israel Klein, FDA Puffery: Smoking Out the Constitutionality of Graphic Cigarette 
Warning Labels, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 201, 220 (2013) (detailing the 
various standards used by the courts in analyzing speech infringement claims); see also Caroline 
Mala Corbin, Speech or Conduct? The Free Speech Claims of Wedding Vendors, 65 EMORY L.J. 
241, 281 (2015) (stating that Wooley involved strict scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny used 
for merely expressive conduct); Brian Galle, Free Exercise Rights of Capital Jurors, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 569, 581 n.57 (2001) (noting the application of “strict scrutiny review” in major free 
speech cases); B. Ashby Hardesty, Jr., Joe Camel Versus Uncle Sam: The Constitutionality of 
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speech realm, laws have been deemed content-based, and thus deserving of 
“exacting scrutiny,” simply because they required a speaker to provide the 
“content” of the speaker’s identity.133 
Some scholars have tried to justify less searching scrutiny for religious 
claims by drawing a distinction between the government having less interest 
in prohibiting what people say (which implicates speech) than what they do 
(which implicates religious exercise). One such scholar, for example, argues 
for a “weaker test applicable to religious exemption claims” because 
“[w]hen people are asking for freedom not just to speak, or to be treated 
equally without regard to race, but to act, the law must often intrude on that 
freedom.”134 Yet many First Amendment cases demonstrate that such a dis-
tinction is often illusory. Consider the law in Wooley, which the Court de-
scribed as compelling a certain message (a motto on a license plate), and 
thus warranting heightened scrutiny. But again, the plaintiffs’ objection to 
compelled speech at issue in Wooley was coextensive with the plaintiffs’ 
religious exercise—the sincere religious objection to displaying the state 
motto on a license plate.135  
Similarly, in other speech cases like the Barnette decision, the plaintiffs’ 
objection to compelled speech was also coextensive with the plaintiffs’ reli-
gious exercise—a sincere objection to saluting the flag for religious rea-
sons.136 Even in the contraception mandate cases—which are held up by 
some critics as the textbook example of religious action gone too far—some 
plaintiffs raised similar objections to the contraception mandate based on 
                                                                                                                           
Graphic Cigarette Warning Labels, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2811, 2828 (2013) (noting laws that 
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 133 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345, 347 (1995) (concluding that 
restrictions on handing out leaflets expressing a controversial political view was deserving of the 
greatest constitutional protection). 
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speech and association concerns.137 Attempting to categorize “speech” as en-
tirely distinct from religious “action” often amounts to little more than a con-
fusing fiction. As Justice Neil Gorsuch noted in a somewhat similar context: 
[t]he distinction blurs in much the same way the line between acts 
and omissions can blur when stared at too long, leaving us to ask 
(for example) whether the man who drowns by awaiting the in-
coming tide does so by act (coming upon the sea) or omission (al-
lowing the sea to come upon him). Often enough the same facts 
can be described both ways.138 
2. Discretionary Enforcement or Application of a Law 
The Supreme Court has provided as-applied exemptions from facially 
valid laws regulating—or prohibiting—speech in problematic ways. But 
these types of discretionary or open-ended laws often leave religious exer-
cise rights vulnerable as well, particularly for religious minorities. 
For example, in the speech context, in Cohen v. California, the Su-
preme Court upheld a challenge to a law imposing criminal liability for a 
breach of the peace.139 This law had been applied to punish Cohen for wear-
ing a jacket with an offensive message inside the corridor of a court-
house.140 Cohen was arrested and convicted for “maliciously and willfully 
disturbing the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person by offensive 
conduct,” and the California Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that he had 
engaged in “offensive conduct.”141 
The Court rejected a facial challenge to the law, observing that the “stat-
ute [was] applicable throughout the entire State”142 and was not facially 
“overbroad or vague.”143 But the issue remained whether the state had power 
to apply such a law to prohibit protected speech.144 The Court determined 
that, as applied to the facts, the law violated Cohen’s freedom of expression 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See, e.g., Complaint at 39, Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-
521 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 28, 2013) (arguing that “[d]efendants’ actions thus violate [Eternal Word 
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rights.145 The Court explained that the state’s “undifferentiated fear or appre-
hension of disturbance . . . is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of 
expression.”146 The Court thus reversed Cohen’s conviction, holding that “the 
state may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make 
the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter expletive a 
criminal offense.”147 Cohen was thus entitled to an exemption from the oth-
erwise lawful application of the state’s breach of the peace statute. 
Because constitutional religious exemptions are much more limited 
post-Smith, religious exemptions under RFRA ensure that problematic ap-
plications of neutral laws, like that in Cohen, do not simply go unnoticed 
for vulnerable religious minorities. For example, in 2014, McAllen Grace 
Brethren Church v. Salazar involved the discretionary application of the 
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act.148 Under this law, an undercover 
federal agent infiltrated a sacred Native American powwow and cut the cel-
ebration short when he noticed that tribal members possessed eagle feath-
ers.149 The agent interrogated the powwow participants, confiscated their 
feathers, and threatened them with criminal prosecution unless they signed 
papers abandoning their feathers.150 Without the ability to seek a religious 
exemption under RFRA, the Native Americans in this case would have been 
left with much less effective alternatives for recourse from the govern-
ment’s application of this facially valid statute.151 
3. What About Intermediate Scrutiny? 
Since the 1960s, the Court has frequently applied intermediate scrutiny 
when assessing as-applied challenges to neutral and generally applicable 
laws.152 One prominent example comes from United States v. O’Brien, in 
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which the Supreme Court held that “incidental restrictions” on speech rights 
that resulted from neutral laws were subjected to intermediate scrutiny.153 
O’Brien dealt with an across the board ban on draft-card destruction, which 
was used to prosecute a war protestor who burned his draft card as a form 
of symbolic dissent.154 
Because of the similar factual context of incidental burdens on speech 
versus exemption claims from generally applicable laws, some scholars 
have questioned whether intermediate scrutiny would be a more appropriate 
standard of review for religious exemptions from generally applicable 
laws.155 A thorough analysis of the virtues and consistency of this interme-
diate scrutiny approach in the speech realm is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle,156 but two observations here are worth making. 
First, many scholars correctly observe that the regime under Smith 
looks nothing like intermediate scrutiny.157 Intermediate scrutiny generally 
requires courts to engage in a searching inquiry of whether the government 
action impinging on speech rights is justified. Professor Gedicks has noted 
that “it is not unusual for the Court to invalidate laws under [intermediate 
scrutiny].”158 For example, in McCullen v. Coakley, anti-abortion protesters 
challenged a Massachusetts restriction limiting speech on public land near 
abortion clinics.159 Even though the Supreme Court engaged in intermediate 
scrutiny analysis, it unanimously ruled against the government and in favor 
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of speech rights.160 Similarly, commercial speech challenges have frequent-
ly resulted in at least intermediate scrutiny and as-applied invalidation of 
government action, even when the law was not struck down facially. Since 
the 1990s, the Court has aggressively protected commercial speech and has 
struck down regulations on the advertising of compound drugs, state re-
strictions on tobacco advertising, and a ban on labels stating the alcoholic 
content of beer.161  
This searching review thus looks nothing like the mere “rational basis 
review” many describe Smith as providing.162 As Professor Oleske explains, 
Smith was problematic because it shifted Supreme Court jurisprudence to 
the extreme of “applying no scrutiny” to “laws incidentally burdening indi-
vidual religious practices . . . .”163 Thus, the Smith framework is anomalous 
in that it fails to at least provide intermediate scrutiny for religious exercise. 
Second, even when dealing with laws that the Court describes as com-
pletely neutral and generally applicable, sometimes the Supreme Court em-
ploys exacting scrutiny for speech rights. For example, in United States v. 
Grace, the Court analyzed a law that included a broad prohibition on ex-
pressive activity on the Supreme Court grounds.164 Some protesters wanted 
to carry signs, banners, or devices on the public sidewalks surrounding the 
Supreme Court, and they challenged the law.165 Although the Court 
acknowledged that this law was “facially content-neutral,” it determined 
that it was still unconstitutional “as-applied” to conduct in which plaintiffs 
in the case wished to engage.166 The Court explained, “[w]e hold that under 
the First Amendment the section is unconstitutional as applied to those 
sidewalks.”167 Thus, the plaintiffs were given an exemption from this con-
tent-neutral law based on what looked like quite exacting scrutiny in the 
free speech context. 
The Court followed a similar approach in the context of the federal 
wiretap act in the 2001 case of Bartnicki v. Vopper.168 There, the Court dealt 
with the question of whether the federal wiretap act could be used to punish 
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 161 See Bhagwat, supra note 152, at 795 nn.80–82 (2007) (citing Thompson v. W. Med. Ctr., 
535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Rubin v. Coors 
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995)); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 
U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (collecting cases where corporate speech protections have resulted in the invali-
dation of government action). 
 162 See, e.g., State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 560 (Wash. 2017) (citing Emp’t 
Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990)). 
 163 Oleske, supra note 155, at 1355. 
 164 461 U.S. at 181. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 181 n.10, 183. 
 167 Id. at 183. 
 168 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001). 
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the publication of an illegally intercepted cellular telephone call.169 The 
Court began by observing that the federal prohibition on intercepting tele-
phone calls was hardly new; rather “federal law has prohibited such disclo-
sures since 1934.”170 The Court found that the act was a facially constitu-
tional and “content-neutral law of general applicability.”171 And the Court 
found that both the federal wiretap act and its Pennsylvania analogue were 
violated by the interception and publication at issue in Bartnicki.172 That 
meant that—at least in the ordinary course—petitioners would be “entitled 
to recover damages from each of the respondents” for the violations.173 
Thus, the Court determined whether it would provide an exception to the 
normal application of the wiretap law for the particular circumstances at 
issue.174 
To analyze this question, it is notable that the Court did not apply the 
O’Brien intermediate scrutiny standard. In fact, three dissenting justices 
argued that the Court should have simply applied O’Brien and upheld the 
application of the law.175 Instead, the Court expressed concern that “en-
forcement of th[e] provision in these cases . . . implicates the core purposes 
of the First Amendment because it imposes sanctions on the publication of 
truthful information of public concern.”176 As a result, the Court indicated 
that the government justification must be of “the highest order,” and no 
such justification existed for this application of the law.177 The Court in 
Bartnicki thus created an exemption to protect constitutional interests from 
an otherwise valid and generally applicable law, and it did so with a search-
ing scrutiny based on the unique First Amendment burdens caused by the 
law’s application.178 
Thus, even when dealing with laws described as neutral and generally 
applicable, in the speech context courts sometimes engage in a searching 
review beyond what is arguably required under O’Brien because of the 
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unique burdens on speech. Arguably, this is quite similar to how a religious 
exemption framework operates when the application of a generally applica-
ble law results in unique burdens on religious exercise.  
4. What About Antidiscrimination Laws and Dignitary Harms? 
The prospect of exemptions to anti-discrimination laws has prompted 
some of the most virulent backlash against religious exemptions to general-
ly applicable laws.179 One of the frequent objections raised is that such ex-
emptions are particularly concerning because of the dignitary harm they 
would inflict on third parties.180 No doubt the prospect of refusal of service 
in any context has the potential to be deeply offensive and hurtful, particu-
larly when it involves goods or services related to one’s identity and signifi-
cant personal life events.181 And the government’s interest in prohibiting 
                                                                                                                           
 179 See generally HAMILTON, supra note 57 (describing religious exemptions as perilous and 
threatening the rule of law); Bagenstos, supra note 57, at 137–40; Terri R. Day & Danielle 
Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA: A Return to Separate but Equal, 65 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 907, 911–12 (2016) (discussing “the tension and interplay between those advocating for 
LGBT-inclusive laws and those seeking protection under state, mini RFRAs from what they char-
acterize as religious discrimination to resist the trend toward LGBT equal rights”); Dhooge, supra 
note 57, at 58–59 (“[A]ny conflicts between religious liberty asserted by secular businesses and 
access to goods and services must be resolved in favor of the government’s compelling interest in 
guaranteeing full and non-discriminatory access for all persons. Such a result does not denigrate 
religion.”); Lederman, supra note 57, at 419 (arguing that “there is widespread fear in some quar-
ters—and presumably hope in others—that such claims might become a template for similar 
claims, pursuant to federal or state RFRAs or analogous state constitutional provisions, for reli-
gious exemptions from laws that prohibit discrimination in employment, or in the provision of 
public accommodations, on the basis of sexual orientation”); Lupu, supra note 66, at 98 (asking if 
RFRA could “now be construed to protect religiously motivated employment discrimination based 
on sexual orientation, or discrimination by wedding vendors, merchants in other contexts, or gov-
ernment officials against same-sex couples”); NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 57, at 2561–63 (not-
ing concern that religious exemptions could be granted from public accommodations laws); Sep-
per, supra note 44, at 26 (noting that “[p]ublic accommodations laws generally apply with full 
force to all businesses serving the public, religiously affiliated or not”); Gasper, supra note 41, at 
414–16; Griffin, supra note 57. 
 180 See, e.g., Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 
189–90 (2011) (describing five different types of dignitary harm). Litigants in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission also argued that to frame the denial of ser-
vice as being about the ability to “obtain goods or services . . . both misunderstands the nature of 
the government interest at stake and trivializes the profound dignitary harm that people experience 
when they are turned away from a business because of who they are.” Brief in Opposition at 24, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111 (Nov. 28, 2016). For a 
response to many of these arguments, see generally Carl H. Esbeck, Do Discretionary Religious 
Exemptions Violate the Establishment Clause?, 106 KENTUCKY L.J. (forthcoming 2018), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2952370 [https://perma.cc/RQK4-36J9]. 
 181 Some scholars have also argued that religious exemption claims based on complicity are 
particularly hurtful for third parties, because such claims involve a moral judgment or indication 
that this third party’s behavior is sinful. See, e.g., NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 57, at 2561–63. 
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dignitary harms is valid when that interest does not come into conflict with 
other constitutional rights. 
However, in the free speech context, the Supreme Court has consist-
ently held that a government’s desire to protect people from emotional 
harm—even far more acute emotional harm than is present in many of the 
wedding vendor cases—does not constitute a compelling government inter-
est.182 For example, it is difficult to imagine more excruciating humiliation, 
degradation, or emotional harm than that endured by the father who saw 
Westboro Baptist Church picketers with signs stating “God Hates Fags,” 
“You’re Going to Hell,” and “God Hates You” at the funeral of his son, a 
Marine killed in Iraq in the line of duty.183 Notably, the plaintiffs’ behavior 
in Snyder v. Phelps constituted action that was simultaneously religious and 
expressive. 
At trial, a Maryland jury found that the Church’s protest met the appli-
cable standards for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(“IIED”), and it returned a verdict of over $10 million for the marine’s 
family.184 Despite this significant emotional distress, the Supreme Court 
upheld an as-applied challenge to the state tort law in an 8-1 decision.185 
The Court explained that although Westboro had “inflict[ed] great 
pain,” freedom of speech protections were a defense against state tort 
claims and prohibited the Court (or the jury) from “react[ing] to that pain by 
punishing the speaker.”186 Because the speech at issue was “entitled to ‘spe-
cial protection’ under the First Amendment,”187 the Court set aside the jury 
verdict and held that the First Amendment precluded recovery for IIED.188 
The Court made clear, though, that it was providing a modest and “narrow” 
ruling that swept “no more broadly” than the specific facts of the as-applied 
challenge before it.189 Thus, not only did the Court provide a limited exemp-
tion to a neutral and generally applicable tort law based on speech protec-
tions, it emphasized that this is the preferred mode of modest adjudication.190 
The Court in Snyder also emphasized the “bedrock principle underly-
ing the First Amendment” that “the government may not prohibit the ex-
                                                                                                                           
 182 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (1983) (noting that the Supreme 
Court has “stated that offensiveness was classically not a justification validating the suppression 
of expression protected by the First Amendment” (internal quotation marks and alterations omit-
ted)). 
 183 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 448. 
 184 Id. at 450. 
 185 Id. at 460–61. 
 186 Id. at 451, 461. 
 187 Id. at 458. 
 188 Id. at 460. 
 189 Id. (citation omitted). 
 190 See id.; see also Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303, 311 (reversing the conviction of a religious 
solicitor based on an as-applied challenge to a breach of the peace statute). 
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pression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”191 Any other result would “effectively empower a majority to 
silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.”192 
Nor is the government entitled to a unique trump card to avoid emo-
tional harm in the context of anti-discrimination laws. In Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, the Court addressed 
whether state law prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations 
could require a private parade to admit a parade group that wished to advo-
cate an LGBT message with which the parade disagreed.193 The Court be-
gan its analysis by addressing the facial validity of the public accommoda-
tion law.194 Specifically, the parade organizers argued that the public ac-
commodation law was “overbroad” and “unconstitutionally vague.”195 The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that “[p]rovisions like these 
are well within the State’s usual power to enact,” and “they do not, as a 
general matter, violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments.”196 Indeed, the 
Court praised such laws as having a “venerable history,”197 and noted that 
the state law prohibition targeted “the act of discriminating against individ-
uals in the provision of publicly available goods, privileges, and services on 
the proscribed grounds.”198 Nor was this statute facially “unusual in any 
obvious way, since it [did] not, on its face, target speech or discriminate on 
the basis of its content.”199 The Supreme Court thus made crystal clear that 
it was dealing with a facially valid law in Hurley. 
The question, then, was whether the parade organizers were entitled to 
an exemption from the application of the otherwise valid anti-discrimination 
law in this case.200 The lower court held that any impact on the parade group’s 
expressive rights was merely “incidental” and “no greater than necessary to 
accomplish the statute’s legitimate purpose of eradicating discrimination.”201 
On this latter point, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the generally 
applicable state law had been applied in such a way as to infringe on “the 
                                                                                                                           
 191 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)); see also 
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71 (holding that “we have consistently held that the fact that protected speech 
may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression”); Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of 
Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43–44 (1977) (per curiam) (holding unconstitutional the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s refusal to stay a prohibition on the right to express anti-semitic messages). 
 192 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. 
 193 515 U.S. 557, 561, 566 (1995). 
 194 Id. at 571–72. 
 195 Id. at 564–65. 
 196 Id. at 572. 
 197 Id. at 571. 
 198 Id. at 572. 
 199 Id. 
  200 Id. at 566. 
 201 Id. at 563 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice 
is presumed to lie beyond the government’s power to control.”202 Thus, the 
application of the public accommodation law here infringed upon First 
Amendment protections, and the parade organizers were entitled to an ex-
emption.203 
The Supreme Court engaged in nearly identical analysis in Boy Scouts 
of America v. Dale.204 There, the New Jersey state court held that the Boy 
Scouts organization was subject to the state public accommodation law, it 
was not exempt under any express exemptions, and it had violated the law 
by revoking the membership of a scout leader because he was a self-
professed gay man.205 In reviewing this holding, the Supreme Court ob-
served that the New Jersey statute defined “place of public accommodation” 
very broadly.206 This breadth did not invalidate the statute on a facial basis, 
but it did mean that “potential for conflict between state public accommoda-
tions laws and the First Amendment rights of organizations has in-
creased.”207 Thus, the Court analyzed “whether the application of New Jer-
sey’s public accommodations law to require that the Boy Scouts accept 
Dale as an assistant scoutmaster runs afoul of the Scouts’ freedom of ex-
pressive association.”208 The Court concluded that it did, reversed the New 
Jersey state court, and provided an exemption from New Jersey’s anti-
discrimination law based on this as-applied challenge.209 
Both Hurley and Dale are fascinating because they result in precisely 
the types of exemptions to anti-discrimination laws in the speech context 
that many scholars find unthinkable in the religious context. In Dale, it was 
surely emotionally distressing for a gay scout leader to be expelled from the 
Boy Scouts; indeed, unlike Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission, which involved a one-time and brief interaction, Dale 
was expelled from a program that had been a major part of his life for near-
ly as long as he could remember.210 Yet the Court determined that here the 
government’s interest was insufficient to trump the Boy Scouts association 
rights.211 
                                                                                                                           
 202 Id. at 575, 577–81; see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (holding 
that the government did not have a compelling government interest in applying public accommo-
dation law to force the Boy Scouts to admit a gay scout leader). 
 203 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573. 
 204 530 U.S. at 646. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 656–57. 
 207 Id. at 657. 
 208 Id. at 656. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. at 644–45. 
 211 Id. at 661; see also Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574 (holding that the exclusion of the LGBT group 
was “hurtful,” but still protected). 
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In the anti-discrimination conflicts currently percolating, including in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, religious objectors have generally raised both free 
speech and religious exercise claims in which they object to providing artis-
tic services that contradict their beliefs about sexuality.212 But none of these 
business owners have engaged in targeted expression that comes close to 
the intentionally hurtful speech at issue in Snyder, nor the total exclusion of 
an individual from all aspects of an organization as in Dale. Rather, in Mas-
terpiece Cakeshop for example, the baker was willing to sell a wide range 
of baked goods to LGBT individuals; his objection was limited to creating a 
custom-designed wedding cake for a same-sex wedding.213 This is true of 
the run of the wedding vendor cases.214 In fact, in most of these cases the 
would-be-customer must take the additional step of deducing implied dis-
approval from the denial of a particular artistic service.215 It is inherently 
contradictory to suggest that implicit disapproval is somehow more likely to 
inflict dignitary harm than a direct and purposefully hateful expression of 
disapproval allowed in the speech context. 
One might argue that Hurley and Dale are not analogous, because 
Masterpiece Cakeshop involves a denial of a commercial service offered to 
                                                                                                                           
 212 See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order on Cross, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 
No. CV-2008-06632 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 2009), 2009 WL 8747805 (raising free speech and 
religious claims); Complaint at 1–2, Amy Lynn Photography Studio, LLC v. City of Madison, No. 
2017-cv-000555 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 7, 2017); In re Melissa Elaine Klein, 2015 WL 4868796, at 
*32–34 (Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus. July 2, 2015) (Nos. 44-14, 44-15) (same). 
 213 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276–77, 280–81 (Colo. App. 2015), 
cert. denied sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 2015SC738, 
2016 WL 1645027 (Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (mem.). 
 214 See Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422, 429 (App. Div. 2016) (noting that objectors 
“would happily host wedding receptions, parties, or other events for couples in same-sex relation-
ships,” just not weddings) (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 
P.3d 543, 550 (Wash. 2017) (holding that a florist had always served “gay and lesbian customers 
in the past for other, non-wedding-related flower orders”); Klein, 2015 WL 4868796, at *35, *51 
(finding that objector claimed refusal of service “was not on account of . . . sexual orientation, but 
on . . . objection to participation in the event for which the cake would be prepared”); Complaint 
¶¶ 22, 76–79, Country Mill Farms, LLC v. City of East Lansing, No. 1:17-cv-00487, 2017 WL 
2387921 (W.D. Mich. May 31, 2017) (arguing that the operator of a farm “gladly s[old] produce 
to all comers at the Market” and had “employed people from a wide variety of racial, cultural, and 
religious backgrounds, including members of the LGBT community”); Brief in Chief of Appel-
lant, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2010 N.M. App. Ct. Briefs LEXIS *1, at *6–7 (N.M. 
Ct. App. June 3, 2010) (arguing that “[w]hat is crucial for Elane Photography is the message con-
veyed by its photos, not the sexual orientation of the people in its photos.” (internal record cita-
tions omitted)); Complaint ¶ 7, Amy Lynn Photography, No. 2017-cv-000555 (arguing that pho-
tographer “serves individuals of every sexual orientation and every political belief”). 
 215 For example, in Arlene’s Flowers, Baronelle Stutzman took the would-be customer by the 
hand and, after expressing her regard for him, told him she could not arrange flowers for his wed-
ding because of her religious beliefs. But she did not express any disapproval of her customer or 
his relationship. See Brief of Appellants at 13, Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. Oct. 16, 
2015) (No. 91615-2), 2015 WL 12632392. 
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the public. Such an argument must be broken down to its parts. First, as to 
payment received, the Supreme Court has long held in the speech context: 
“It is well settled that a speaker’s rights are not lost merely because com-
pensation is received; a speaker is no less a speaker because he or she is 
paid to speak.”216 And in Hobby Lobby, seven of the nine Supreme Court 
justices have at least implicitly recognized that the same principle is true for 
religious exercise.217 
Is there, then, something uniquely unassailable about the government’s 
interest when a service is being offered to the public? Or, as some scholars 
argue, must “any conflicts” asserted by public accommodations “be re-
solved in favor of the government’s compelling interest in guaranteeing full 
and non-discriminatory access for all persons?”218 To answer those ques-
tions, one must also answer the following: Could the government require a 
baker who supports Black Lives Matter to bake a Confederate flag-themed 
cake for a rally being held by the Aryan Nations church? Or could the gov-
ernment force LGBT business owners to bake a cake for a Westboro Baptist 
Church protest? Does the fact that these bakers offer similar cakes to the 
public really change the analysis? 
It turns out these are not simply hypothetical thought experiments. After 
the recent neo-Nazi demonstrations in Charlottesville, a swarm of businesses 
reacted by refusing to continue providing services to white supremacist or-
ganizations.219 A salon refused to continue styling the hair of a politician who 
                                                                                                                           
 216 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988). 
 217 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (only Justice Sotomayor joined the portion of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent that argued that cor-
porations cannot exercise religion). 
 218 Dhooge, supra note 57, at 58–59; see also Joseph William Singer, We Don’t Serve Your 
Kind Here: Public Accommodations and the Mark of Sodom, 95 B.U. L. REV. 929, 930–33 (2015) 
(analyzing the connection between private property rights and anti-discrimination laws). 
 219 See, e.g., Bill Chappell, Neo-Nazi Site Daily Stormer Is Banned by Google After Attempted 
Move from GoDaddy, NPR: THE TWO-WAY (Aug. 14, 2017, 8:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2017/08/14/543360434/white-supremacist-site-is-banned-by-go-daddy-after-virginia-
rally [https://perma.cc/9TDM-YM7F] (noting that a white supremacist site was banned by GoDaddy 
after Virginia rally); Tracy Jan & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Silicon Valley Escalates Its War on White Su-
premacy Despite Free Speech Concerns, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/economy/silicon-valley-escalates-its-war-on-white-supremacy-despite-free-speech-
concerns/2017/08/16/842771b8-829b-11e7-902a-2a9f2d808496_story.html?utm_term=.3ee823f
7eb96 [https://perma.cc/C5WC-88YC]; Blake Montgomery, PayPal, GoFundMe, and Patreon Banned 
a Bunch of People Associated with the Alt-Right. Here’s Why, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 2, 2017, 9:01 
AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/blakemontgomery/the-alt-right-has-a-payment-processor-problem?
utm_term=.sjNDdwQ8Y#.alq53Qga4 [https://perma.cc/DS5U-6JCJ]; Caroline O’Donovan, Uber 
Bans Racists Too, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 21, 2017, 12:10 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/
carolineodonovan/uber-is-also-willing-to-ban-white-supremacists?utm_term=.jlMoBP3qM#.ryKQ
AoZPg [https://perma.cc/C3E8-94ZF]; Erik Ortiz et al., Ahead of Far Right Wing Ralley in Virgin-
ia, Airbnb Cancels Accounts, NBC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2017, 5:38 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/ahead-far-right-wing-rally-virginia-airbnb-cancels-accounts-n790716 [https://perma.
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would not take a position supportive of LGBT rights.220 A gay coffee shop 
owner recently refused to serve a group of pro-life activists, ejecting them 
from his store.221And in the relevant factual context for Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, the Colorado Commission allowed three bakers (including LGBT 
business owners) to refuse a religious customer’s request to create custom 
cakes with religious messages criticizing same-sex marriage.222 The Commis-
sion also admitted that a baker could decline to create a cake with a design or 
symbol that was “offensive,” including “a white-supremacist message for the 
Aryan Nation,” or “a cake denigrating the Koran . . . .”223 If one thinks that 
any of these businesses are justified in denying their services to individuals, 
groups, or events to which they object, then one must acknowledge that the 
government does not have an unassailable interest in coercing the provision 
of any product or service that is already offered to the public. 
To be sure, there are some cases dealing with services or products of-
fered in the public sphere where the government would prevail over First 
Amendment objections. But in the public accommodation context, the 
foundational government interest capable of trumping First Amendment 
objections is not avoiding dignitary harms or conscripting public vendors 
into government service. It is the government’s interest in “removing the 
barriers to economic advancement and political and social integration that 
have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups.”224 And the unani-
mous Supreme Court in Hurley has already pointed to factors that should be 
assessed when the Court must balance First Amendment rights with state 
                                                                                                                           
cc/L2JP-VX58]; Matthew Rozsa, After Charlottesville, Spotify Is Pulling White Supremacist Mu-
sic from Its Platform, SALON (Aug. 17, 2017, 10:59 AM), http://www.salon.com/2017/08/17/hate-
groups-spotify-is-pulling-white-supremacist-music/ [https://perma.cc/8LKW-KLKT]; Nick Statt, 
Apple Pay Is Dropping Support for Websites That Sell White Supremacist Merchandise, THE 
VERGE (Aug. 16, 2017, 6:51 PM), https://www.theverge.com/platform/amp/2017/8/16/16159310/
apple-pay-drops-support-white-supremacist-neo-nazi-merchandise [https://perma.cc/EM7J-QAMR]. 
 220 Erik Hayden, Stylist Refuses to Cut New Mexico Governor’s Hair Over Gay-Marriage 
Stance, TIME (Feb. 23, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/02/23/stylist-refuses-to-cut-new-
mexico-governors-hair-over-gay-marriage-stance/ [https://perma.cc/29TV-7VNV]. 
 221 Douglas Ernst, Christian Activists Booted from Seattle Coffee Shop: ‘I’m Gay. You Have to 
Leave,’ WASH. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/oct/6/christian-
activists-booted-from-seattle-coffee-sho/; see also Stephanie Barclay, Religious Baker Who Refused 
to Make a Wedding Cake for Gay Couple Deserves Protection Whether You Agree with Him or Not, 
PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 19, 2018, 10:49 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/opinion/commentary/
masterpiece-cakeshop-supreme-court-scotus-gay-wedding-cake-20180119.html [https://perma.cc/
7K88-RCUT]. 
 222 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 282 n.8 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 2015SC738, 2016 
WL 1645027 (Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. 
Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (mem.). 
 223 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, app. at 56a–58a, 78a, Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16-111. 
 224 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984). 
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interests.225 Specifically, (1) does the public accommodation “disclaim any 
intent to exclude [a class of individuals] as such” (which would create a 
more significant barrier to economic or political advancement), or does the 
public accommodation have a more discreet objection to something like a 
particular “message” or event;226 and (2) is the public accommodation “an 
abiding monopoly of access,” or does the would-be customer have a “fair 
shot” at obtaining the service elsewhere?227 
The answers to these questions will vary depending on the evidence 
the government has marshaled regarding a market failure it needs to ad-
dress, the economic reality in which the conflict arises, and the breadth of 
the First Amendment objection at issue. When courts balance these im-
portant interests, the religious objector will not always win.228 But the im-
portant point is that in these balancing scenarios, the religious objector’s 
rights should be given some weight. The theory advanced by critics under 
their view of Smith would give religious objections virtually no weight at 
                                                                                                                           
 225 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000). 
 226 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572. The government will have a stronger interest in combatting the 
type of class-based market failures approximating the Jim Crow South discrimination, which orig-
inally motivated widespread public accommodation laws. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252–53 (1964) (recounting obstacles to service for African Ameri-
cans prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964); John D. Inazu, A Confident Pluralism, 88 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 587, 603 (2015) (“There remains . . . a crucial difference between the race-based discrimina-
tion against African Americans in the Jim Crow South and any other form of discrimination or 
exclusion in our country. The pervasive impediments to equal citizenship for African Americans 
have not been matched by any other recent episode in American history. Our country has harmed 
many people . . . . But the systemic and structural injustices perpetrated against African Ameri-
cans—and the extraordinary remedies those injustices warranted—remain in a class of their 
own.”). 
 227 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572–78. Other state supreme courts have similarly explained that a 
government can demonstrate a compelling government interest where some market failure is pre-
venting a class of individuals from obtaining a good or service. For example, in a conflict between 
public accommodation laws and free exercise rights in Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court 
explained that the government must prove that accommodating the religious objectors would “sig-
nificantly imped[e] the availability” of the requested service because a “large percentage of units” 
were unavailable to the would-be customers. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240 
(Mass. 1994). The court rejected a general interest in “eliminating discrimination” and noted that 
“the analysis must be more focused.” Id. at 238. Illinois and Michigan have adopted the same 
approach as Massachusetts. See Jasniowski v. Rushing, 685 N.E.2d 622, 622 (Ill. 1997) (reversing 
a ruling requiring a religious landlord to lease to a cohabiting couple); McCready v. Hoffius, 593 
N.W.2d 545, 545 (Mich. 1999) (same). For an economic analysis about why a focus on market 
access is important in this fraught anti-discrimination debate, see generally Nathan B. Oman, 
Doux Commerce, Religion, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 92 IND. L.J. 693 (2017). 
 228 Easier cases would be where the government has demonstrated a monopoly or a market 
failure regarding an important service. For example, if a religious couple owned a hotel in a re-
mote location and they were unwilling to house LGBT individuals, the government would have a 
stronger case for trumping any First Amendment rights. Similarly, the Desilets court indicated that 
the government could have prevailed if it had presented evidence showing a “significant housing 
problem” where “a large percentage of units are unavailable to cohabitants.” 636 N.E.2d at 240. 
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all—resulting instead in an automatic victory for the government anywhere 
it can point to an abstract interest in prohibiting discrimination.229 Notably, 
this crabbed reading of the Free Exercise Clause as necessarily giving way 
to any anti-discrimination interest has already been unanimously rejected by 
the Supreme Court in the context of federal and state employment anti-
discrimination laws.230 Thus, the principled alternative is that the govern-
ment should carry the burden of demonstrating a need to remove barriers to 
economic and political advancement under strict scrutiny in this context, 
and that scrutiny should be just as strict regardless of whether the objection 
that triggers this analysis is based on speech or religious grounds.231 
Finally, Professor Case argues that “[a]dvocates of exemptions from 
public accommodation laws for service providers who refuse to provide 
flowers or cake for same-sex wedding celebrations have yet to explain 
whether and why the claims of these Christian bakers and florists are more 
worthy of accommodation” than other groups.232 But perhaps the more rele-
vant question for Professor Case and other objecting scholars is this: why are 
Christian bakers and florists less worthy of accommodation than groups who 
would engage in nearly identical behavior for equally expressive, but not nec-
essarily religious, purposes? And more broadly, why should religious as-
applied challenges be treated less favorably than other First Amendment as-
applied challenges? 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS VERSUS SPEECH CLAIMS 
The cases surveyed above demonstrate that courts already provide ex-
emptions in other First Amendment contexts, even in the context of generally 
applicable laws.233 Thus, providing religious exemptions does not “elevate[] 
religious freedom to a preferred position among First Amendment rights.”234 
But what of Justice Scalia’s concern that religious exemptions pose a 
special threat of a society “courting anarchy?” Is less protective treatment 
                                                                                                                           
 229 See, e.g., State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 562 (Wash. 2017) (citing Emp’t 
Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990)) (citing Smith as providing mere 
rational basis review for religious exercise, and deferring without question to the government’s 
abstract interest in combatting discrimination). 
 230 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188–89 
(2012) (holding that that constitutional right under the religion clauses trumped the application of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 231 The Supreme Court has made clear that a government interest that is found lacking in one 
context does not transform into a compelling interest when it arises in the religious context. See 
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 429–30 (holding that whether strict scrutiny is triggered by the Free Speech 
Clause or RFRA, “the consequences are the same”). 
 232 Case, supra note 1, at 485. 
 233 See supra notes 93–232 and accompanying text. 
 234 LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 55, at 11. 
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of religious objections warranted based on something else problematic 
about religious objections compared to other First Amendment claims? Is 
there something about the infinite variety of practices of faiths that distin-
guishes religion as giving rise to more voluminous risks than those posed by 
speech or association, particularly post Hobby Lobby’s heightened protec-
tion for such rights? For example, as discussed above, critics such as Pro-
fessor Case argue that Hobby Lobby creates a “risk of havoc” without any 
“stopping point . . . .”235 Further, Case suggests that Hobby Lobby has 
“open[ed] up the floodgates to a host of new potential claims for religious 
exemption by a host of different kinds of service providers.”236 Similarly, 
Professor Corvino suggests that “many find Hobby Lobby worrisome” be-
cause religious conduct that receives protection for “exemption and ac-
commodation purposes” is “expansive and expanding,” and has a unique 
“pervasiveness” with an “endless variety of religious scruples.”237 Professor 
Leslie Griffin argues that because of “Hobby Lobby,” the “broad reading of 
RFRA . . . will encourage many future lawsuits and undermine more civil 
liberties.”238 She also asserted that “[a]lmost anything can be turned into a 
claim of ‘cooperation with evil’” and “all federal laws are now subject to 
challenge, with the possibility of every citizen becoming ‘a law unto him-
self’ until the rule of law is undermined.”239 Professor Elizabeth Sepper ar-
gues that “[t]he Hobby Lobby decision throws open the courtroom door to 
corporations and hands them the now-powerful weapon of corporate con-
science to fight off regulation that protects the full and equal citizenship of 
the people.”240 And Professor Marshall asserts that “[t]he risk that Hobby 
Lobby invites flimsy but readily sustainable RFRA claims by entities en-
gaged in commercial activity then should be apparent. A financial incentive 
combined with a high likelihood of success is a dangerous mix.”241 This line 
of thinking, if true, counsels that a religious exemption regime, with “an 
                                                                                                                           
 235 Case, supra note 1, at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 236 Id. at 487. 
 237 CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 38, 46, 47–50. 
 238 Griffin, supra note 60, at 673. 
 239 Id. at 687–88; see also Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 61, at 1133–34 (“This deci-
sion will lead to much broader challenges. Christian Scientists, for example, will claim that they 
do not have to provide any health insurance to their employees.”); Garfield, supra note 61, at 825 
(arguing that “[b]y tipping the scales so drastically in favor of religious objectors, Alito put out a 
welcome mat for religious objections by corporations”); Robertson, supra note 61, at 569 (arguing 
that “the ruling casts a shadow over all public health regulation, given that virtually any objector 
can cloak their objection in religious garb”); Stephens, supra note 61, at 4 (arguing that “[t]he 
Court’s significant expansion of religious liberty doctrine in [Burwell v. Hobby Lobby] invites 
businesses to seek exemptions from nondiscrimination laws such as Title VII, the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as other laws, which provide 
workplace protections to women, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act”). 
 240 Sepper, supra note 62, at 233. 
 241 Marshall, supra note 8, at 120. 
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endless chain of exemption demands,” is a distinct threat to the rule of law 
because it will result in a tidal wave of religious claimants striking down 
government action at every turn.242 
To examine this claim, we conducted a modest empirical analysis to 
assess (1) the likelihood that religious exemptions result in government ac-
tion being struck down under RFRA, and how that rate has changed since 
Hobby Lobby; and (2) the volume of religious objection cases being brought 
compared to speech-based cases, and whether the volume of religious 
claims seem to have increased dramatically post Hobby Lobby. Notably, we 
provide the first nation-wide RFRA survey of its kind since Hobby Lobby. 
Our findings contradict the notion that religious objections are much 
more likely to prompt a court to strike down government action under 
RFRA after Hobby Lobby.243 Compared to previous scholarship assessing 
government win rates in this area, Hobby Lobby does not appear to have 
significantly changed the government’s win rate in the last three years. Our 
findings also indicate that cases dealing with religious objections to laws 
are less pervasive than cases dealing with other expressive First Amend-
ment claims.244 These findings apply to all federal cases, as well as the cases 
specifically at the Supreme Court level. The data also does not indicate a 
trend of dramatic growth in the volume of religious cases post Hobby Lob-
by. More time and data will be necessary to confirm these results. Addition-
ally, no statistical regression analysis has been performed to isolate the ef-
fect of variables, and the findings in this Article are thus at best suggestive. 
A. Methodology 
We utilized three different methods to analyze religious objection 
claims compared to other speech and association claims, both in terms of 
volume and likelihood of striking down government action. Each of these 
methods is discussed in turn below. 
We also compared our findings to the helpful empirical research of 
Professor Adam Winkler, who reviewed all federal cases from 1990 to 2003 
dealing with strict scrutiny, including cases dealing with suspect classifica-
tions, speech, religious liberty, fundamental rights, and freedom of associa-
tion.245 Though somewhat dated (and inapplicable to questions about how 
                                                                                                                           
 242 Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problems of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Reli-
gion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 947 (1989); see also supra notes 152–178 and accompanying text. 
 243 See infra notes 267–292 and accompanying text. 
 244 See infra notes 267–292 and accompanying text. 
 245 See generally Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of 
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006). Other authors have also sur-
veyed RFRA cases in the Tenth Circuit recently. See generally Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N. 
Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An Empirical Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cas-
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Hobby Lobby changed the pervasiveness of religious objections), Professor 
Winkler’s research serves as a useful benchmark. 
1. New RFRA Survey Methodology 
 To assess how Hobby Lobby has impacted the government’s win rate 
in RFRA cases, we surveyed all federal RFRA court cases available in 
Westlaw that have been brought in the three-year period since Hobby Lob-
by.246 We analyzed the court rulings to determine how frequently the court 
ruled for the plaintiff on a RFRA claim versus how frequently the court 
ruled for the government. The universe of RFRA cases was created using 
two types of searches. The first was a general Westlaw search for RFRA 
terms in the federal cases database: 
 Search: advanced: (“religious freedom restoration act” RFRA 
“42 U.S.C. s 2000bb”) & DA(aft 06-30-2014 & bef 07-01-
2017). 
o Results: 478 cases. 
For our second method, we used the Westlaw citing references feature 
to identify any cases citing to the five statutory sections of RFRA for the 
same three-year time period. We then cross-referenced both search results, 
removing any duplicate decisions. Only two new cases resulted from this 
second citing reference search method, bringing the total universe of cases 
to 480 cases.247 
                                                                                                                           
es, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 353 (2018) (surveying Tenth Circuit religious liberty cases from 
2012–2017). 
 246 The relevant time period was June 30, 2014–July 17, 2017. Some applications of RFRA 
necessarily evaded the data set if they unreported cases, or not part of Westlaw’s database. We 
assume that such cases are more likely to be government wins, and that a court decision overturn-
ing government action would result in a reported case. This may mean that the government win 
rate is in actuality even higher. We excluded the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act (“RLUIPA”) cases from the dataset because the standard for RLUIPA was not clearly estab-
lished as being as protective as RFRA until the Supreme Court’s decision a year after Hobby Lob-
by in Holt v. Hobbs. To avoid potential data skewing that would result partially through the three-
year period based on that evolving standard, and where the purpose of this analysis is to assess the 
impact of Hobby Lobby, those RLUIPA cases were excluded. 
 247 The search terms and results for this method included the following: 
 
 Search: Federal cases under citing references for 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb from July 1, 2014 
– June 30, 2017. 
o Results: 190 cases, but only 1 additional new case. 
 Search: Federal cases under citing references for 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 from July 1, 
2014 – June 30, 2017. 
o Results: 180 cases, but only 1 additional new case. 
 Search: Federal cases under citing references for 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 from July 1, 
2014 – June 30, 2017. 
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We analyzed a judicial decision as a single application of RFRA, re-
gardless of the number of judges on the panel. Preliminary rulings and deci-
sions that were subsequently reversed or affirmed on appeal were collected 
but, unless otherwise specified, were excluded from the reported results to 
avoid double counting.248 Additionally, only decisions in the relevant three-
year period were counted, and it is possible that some of these decisions 
could be subsequently reversed. With the help of excellent research assis-
tance, we manually reviewed all 480 cases to ensure that any decisions not 
addressing RFRA on the merits were also excluded.249 This brought the uni-
verse of unique cases addressing RFRA on the merits to a total of 101 cases. 
Many of the other cases were disposed of on procedural grounds or other 
legal claims. 
Unsurprisingly, there were a number of cases (thirty-one to be precise) 
dealing with essentially the same challenge to the “contraception mandate” 
of the Affordable Care Act. These cases arose in different jurisdictions but 
addressed the same issue that was ultimately addressed by the Supreme 
Court either in Hobby Lobby (for the for-profit organizations) or in the con-
solidated appeal in Zubik v. Burwell (for the nonprofit organizations).250 In 
light of the government’s announcement to resolve these cases through reg-
ulatory action after the Supreme Court’s decision in Zubik, we decided that 
the most conservative course was to treat these cases as separate govern-
ment losses.251 We made this decision given that many religious exemption 
                                                                                                                           
o Results: 30 cases, but 0 additional new cases. 
 Search: Federal cases under citing references for 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 from July 1, 
2014 – June 30, 2017. 
o Results: 16 cases, but 0 additional new cases. 
 Search: Federal cases under citing references for 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4 from July 1, 
2014 – June 30, 2017. 
o Results: 30 cases, but 0 additional new cases. 
 248 The empirical analysis by Adam Winkler on strict scrutiny applications similarly analyzed 
court rulings, but excluded cases that were preliminary or that were addressed by another court on 
appeal. Winkler, supra note 245, at 844–45. 
 249 A decision was considered “on the merits” if the court made a determination regarding 
whether there was a sincere religious belief, a substantial burden on religious exercise, the gov-
ernment had a compelling interest, or the regulation was the least restrictive means. This included 
when the court discussed whether plaintiff alleged enough facts to support his RFRA claim (i.e. at 
the motion to dismiss stage). Not considered “on the merits” included cases where the RFRA 
claim was dismissed because the defendant was a state or private actor, or the plaintiff did not 
exhaust administrative remedies. 
 250 See HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET, http://www.becketlaw.org/research-
central/hhs-info-central/ [https://perma.cc/D3A9-HZJ5] (compiling a database of cases challeng-
ing the HHS mandate); see, e.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560–61 (2016) (vacating 
Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuit Courts decisions that held HHS constitutional, and remand-
ing to address the issue of employers providing notice of their religious objections). 
 251 In May 2016, the Supreme Court unanimously overturned lower court rulings against 
religious objectors, ordered the government not to fine the objectors, and said the lower courts 
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objectors are likely particularly concerned about these cases. Arguably, 
these cases could be treated as one case, or excluded altogether. Thus, we 
presented alternative findings treating these cases as two government losses 
(one loss for the government against for-profit challenges in Hobby Lobby, 
and one loss for the government against nonprofits in Zubik), or excluding 
these cases completely. 
A final point of clarification is in order. The purpose of this methodol-
ogy is to examine how courts have applied strict scrutiny under RFRA since 
Hobby Lobby; it is not to determine how strict scrutiny might affect liti-
gants, legislators, government officials, or others. Our goal was not to de-
termine how strict scrutiny impacts the decision of lawmakers to adopt 
laws, government officials to enforce laws, or litigants to bring, settle, or 
appeal lawsuits. That is not something that could be measured by this da-
ta.252 Thus, this case survey does not capture other possible significant im-
pacts Hobby Lobby may have had on the willingness of government offi-
cials to enforce certain laws or the willingness of litigants to bring lawsuits. 
2. Targeted Comparative Searches Methodology 
 For our second method, we wanted to find a way to compare the vol-
ume of speech cases to religious exercise cases. Religious exercise cases 
include constitutional cases and thus present a broader universe of claims 
than just RFRA cases. That is why an additional search method was re-
quired to assess case volume beyond our new RFRA survey.253 Initially, we 
assessed a snapshot of all cases that have been brought since the Hobby 
Lobby decision in June 2014. To do this we ran three targeted searches in 
Westlaw to identify the approximate number of religious cases compared to 
other expressive First Amendment cases. We first ran searches using 
Westlaw’s key number system to assess how many cases were assigned 
Westlaw’s “speech and expression” key number versus its “religious exer-
                                                                                                                           
should provide the government with an opportunity “to arrive at an approach going forward that 
accommodates the petitioners’ religious beliefs.” Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560. In May 2017, the 
President issued an executive order directing the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) and other agencies to protect religious ministries from the HHS mandate. Exec. Order 
No. 13,798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,675 (May 4, 2017). Further government action to finalize policy 
changes to the contraception mandate is anticipated. 
 252 The data’s failure to account for primary behavior is an admitted weakness, but the nature 
of the relevant question makes it almost impossible to collect the type of data that would be neces-
sary to analyze the effects of Hobby Lobby on primary behavior. 
 253 If we had limited our dataset to just RFRA cases, this would have skewed the religious 
claims and indicated they were even smaller compared to other First Amendment expressive cases 
than they already are. 
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cise” key number.254 Second, we ran searches with relevant speech or reli-
gious-exercise search terms appearing at least four times in the body of a 
case.255 Third, we ran searches with the same speech or religious-exercise 
search terms appearing in the Westlaw summary of the case.256 Each search 
was limited to the time period of June 30, 2014, to June 30, 2017.257 Each of 
these searches has its own shortcomings in perfectly capturing the universe 
of speech or free exercise cases in the last three years, but together these 
searches triangulate to provide a likely relevant data point for the compara-
tive volume of cases brought over the last three years.258 
It is possible that this data, as a snapshot in time, would not reveal a 
sharp upward trend in the growth of religious cases. Thus, to analyze trends 
over time in volume, we used the targeted search language for the Westlaw 
key number system and ran that search limited by year for each year dating 
back to 1946.259 We chose this year because (as discussed below) the modern 
Spaeth Database begins in 1946 as well.260 We compared speech to religious 
cases over time in absolute terms, and also as a percentage of all reported cas-
es by year. We used the number of all reported cases by year that was provid-
ed in the Lexis database. Westlaw does not report more than ten-thousand 
cases in any search category, but Lexis does not cap the number of cases pro-
                                                                                                                           
 254 For speech cases, the following search was used in all state and federal cases: “adv: 
TO(92xviii) & DA(aft 06-30-2014 & bef 07-01-2017).” This search references the Westlaw key 
number 92, Section XVIII—Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Press, k1490-k2309. For reli-
gious exercise cases, the following search was used in all state and federal cases: “adv: TO(92xiii) 
& DA(aft 06-30-2014 & bef 07-01-2017).” This search references the Westlaw key number 92, 
Section XIII—Freedom of Religion and Conscience, k1290-k1429. 
 255 For speech cases, the following search was used in all state or federal cases: “adv: AT-
LEAST4(“freedom #of speech”) ATLEAST4(“freedom #of press”) ATLEAST4(“freedom #of 
association”) ATLEAST4(“freedom #to associate”) & DA(aft 06-30-2014 & bef 07-01-2017).” 
For religious exercise cases, the following search was used in all state or federal cases: “adv: AT-
LEAST4(“freedom #of relig!”) ATLEAST4(rfra) & DA(aft 06-30-2014 & bef 07-01-2017).” 
 256 For speech cases, the following search was used in all state or federal cases: “adv: 
SY((free! /5 speech! press associat!)) & DA(aft 06-30-2014 & bef 07-01-2017).” For religious 
exercise cases, the following search was in all state or federal cases: “adv: SY((relig! /5 exerc!) 
rfra (free! /5 relig!)) & DA(aft 06-30-2014 & bef 07-01-2017).” 
 257 All relevant searches were run between October 19, 2017, and October 24, 2017. We un-
derstand that the numbers that come back in Westlaw searches may be subject to minor change, 
given that Westlaw is continually adding new cases to its library. 
 258 As a starting matter, Westlaw does not claim to include all unpublished cases in its search-
able databases. 
 259 For counting purposes, our year began on July 1, the day after Hobby Lobby was decided, 
and it ended on June 30. So, a search for one year of Westlaw key number cases would look like 
this: “adv: (TO(92xviii)) & DA(aft 06-30-1945 & bef 07-01-1946).” 
 260 We used the Westlaw key number for our search over time because this category was 
created by a third party, and thus less susceptible to a critique that we relied on biased search 
terms. 
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vided in search results.261 Thus, for the numerator we used the number of re-
ligious or speech Westlaw key cases in a given year, and for the denominator 
we used the number of all reported cases in that same year. We then displayed 
the findings from this methodology in two different graphs. 
3. Spaeth Database Methodology 
 Finally, although the findings of the first two methods provide infor-
mation about volume and win rates for all federal cases, some may wonder 
whether a comparatively larger proportion of religious cases percolate 
through the court system to the Supreme Court, and what type of win rates 
those religious cases enjoy. We thus compared religious exercise versus 
other expressive Supreme Court cases using Harold J. Spaeth’s U.S. Su-
preme Court Database.262 This database codes all Supreme Court decisions 
from 1946 to 2016 based on numerous factors, including the particular legal 
issue, as well as the party that was successful. This coding “makes amassing 
data on the Court’s First Amendment decisions a relatively straightforward 
task.”263 We first looked at all of the speech and association Supreme Court 
cases in which the government was clearly successful, either as the petition-
er or the respondent.264 We then did the same thing for cases coded as reli-
gious exercise cases.265 Notably, this Spaeth coding of a winning party does 
not ensure that a religious or speech claim, respectively, is the winning issue 
on the merits. Thus, the value of these win rates is limited. 
In terms of providing a fully representative dataset, there are some ob-
vious limitations with the Spaeth database. Most notably, the database is 
limited to Supreme Court decisions, which are not representative of other 
                                                                                                                           
 261 To obtain the number of all reported cases from Lexis, we used the term “cite(lexis)” 
across all Federal and State cases. All cases in the Lexis database are given Lexis citations, so this 
brought back a total amount of the number of reported cases in the Lexis database. We ran this 
“cite(lexis)” search year by year, and used this number for the denominator. 
 262 Modern Database: 2017 Release 01, WASH. UNIV. LAW: THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE 
(Aug. 14, 2017), http://supremecourtdatabase.org/data.php [https://perma.cc/XVZ9-QW6Q]. 
 263 Id.; see, e.g., Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Trumping the First Amendment?, 21 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 81, 92 (2006) (discussing the use of the database to analyze other aspects of First 
Amendment cases). 
 264 For this coding under the “Legal Provisions” section of the database, we selected the 
“Constitutional Amendment” section and then the “First Amendment” subsection. We then select-
ed both the “association” category and the “speech, press, or assembly” category. We then ran 
searches under this category where the government was coded as a party, and assessed win-rates 
based on when the government was the winning party. 
 265 For this coding under the “Legal Provisions” section of the database, we selected the 
“Constitutional Amendment” section and then the “First Amendment” subsection. We then select-
ed the “free exercise of religion” category. We similarly ran searches under this category where 
the government was coded as a party, and assessed win-rates based on when the government was 
the winning party. We also added the three RFRA cases to this category. 
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federal cases.266 Still, this database does provide a useful data point for the 
volume of meritorious cases that the Supreme Court is interested in address-
ing for speech compared to religious exercise issues. The modern database 
time-period ends in 2017 (the 2016 term). 
B. Findings 
Our findings do not indicate that government win rates have undergone 
a dramatic change since Hobby Lobby. Though the data does not assess the 
impact of Hobby Lobby on primary behavior, it does contradict the fear of 
some critics that Hobby Lobby will “encourage many future lawsuits,”267 
“throw[] open the courtroom door to corporations,”268 and “invite[] flimsy 
but readily sustainable RFRA claims . . . with a high likelihood of suc-
cess.”269 
Additionally, our findings indicate that reported cases dealing with 
speech claims are much more voluminous than reported cases dealing with 
religious claims, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of all reported 
cases. The trend over time indicates that religious claims are decreasing as a 
percentage of all reported cases, not increasing as some critics fear. 
1. New RFRA Survey Findings  
In our new survey of all federal cases involving a RFRA claim in the 
three years since Hobby Lobby, the government won in fifty out of 101 cas-
                                                                                                                           
 266 According to the Supreme Court’s own website, its current caseload is over 10,000 cases, 
but plenary review is only granted “in about 100 cases per Term,” so less than 1% of all appeals. 
The Justices’ Caseload, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.
gov/about/justicecaseload.pdf [https://perma.cc/DSD3-CQJE]; see also David R. Stras, The Su-
preme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
947, 967, 987 (2007) (book review) (reporting the decrease in cases that the Supreme Court de-
cides on the merits, and noting that the Court granted review over 3% of the time in the early 
1980s but has done so less than 1% of the time since the October 1999 Term, although the number 
of certiorari petitions has steadily increased); The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—The Statistics, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 411, 418 tbl.II(B) (2010) (observing that the Court granted only 0.9% of 8,131 
petitions for review in its 2009 Term). 
 267 Griffin, supra note 60, at 673. 
 268 Sepper, supra note 62, at 233. 
 269 Marshall, supra note 8, at 120. Our findings are consistent with analysis by journalists and 
HHS that there have been very few corporations that have taken advantage of a contraception 
mandate exemption. See, e.g., Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain 
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,838–857 (interim final rules 
with request for comment Oct. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 
C.F.R. pt. 147); Jennifer Haberkorn, Two Years Later, Few Hobby Lobby Copycats Emerge, PO-
LITICO (Oct. 11, 2016, 5:19 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/obamacare-birth-control-
mandate-employers-229627 [https://perma.cc/DT69-6SCH] (“Politico obtained the accommoda-
tion notices filed by employers between [January and March] 2014 . . . . Thirty of the entities are 
nonprofits and 22 are for-profits.”).  
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es, which is a government win rate of fifty percent.270 If contraception man-
date cases are treated as just two consolidated government losses addressed 
by the Supreme court in Hobby Lobby and Zubik (one for the for-profit cas-
es, and one for the nonprofit cases), then the government enjoys a higher 
win rate of sixty-nine percent. If the thirty-one contraception mandate cases 
are excluded altogether, the government’s win rate is seventy-one per-
cent.271 
Our findings on win rates are similar to those from the Winkler sur-
vey.272 Specifically, of all of the rights Professor Winkler surveyed, gov-
ernment action was most likely to succeed in the context of strict scrutiny 
applied to religious claims, with a fifty-nine percent success rate—“more 
than double the mean of the other doctrinal categories.”273 This number in-
creased even further to a seventy-four percent government win rate for reli-
gious claims challenging a generally applicable law.274 In Professor Win-
kler’s findings, speech claims were the most likely to result in striking gov-
ernment action, with the government action at issue surviving a speech 
challenge only twenty-two percent of the time.275 Notably, the government 
action was even less likely to survive a speech challenge than an equal pro-
tection challenge.276 
Table 1 277 
 Government Win Rate 
New RFRA survey findings (counting all 
contraception mandate cases as separate 
government losses) 
50% 
New RFRA survey findings (counting all 
contraception mandate cases as two con-
solidated losses) 
69% 
New RFRA survey findings (excluding all 
contraception mandate cases) 
71% 
                                                                                                                           
 270 The underlying data set for this Table is available at https://docs.google.com/
spreadsheets/d/1wPhJNDX00p5PImroZ7rIUXx_NGxdj2ojTk8AVxIfDUw/edit#gid=1535894163 
(request permission to view from author). 
 271 See infra note 277 and accompanying text (Table 1). 
 272 Winkler, supra note 245, at 844–45. 
 273 Id. at 857–58. 
 274 Id. at 861. This finding by Winkler is not a perfect comparison, as it was not limited to 
RFRA. Id. at 857–58. Additionally, “generally applicable law” is an undefined legal term subject 
to debate, and thus difficult to classify. See Gedicks, supra note 95, at 113 (noting that Employ-
ment Division v. Smith did not define “general applicability”). 
 275 Winkler, supra note 245, at 844. 
 276 Id. 
 277 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-5/barclay-rienzi-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD43-EGQR]. 
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Winkler win rate for all religious claims 59% 
Winkler win rate for religious challenges 
to generally applicable laws (not targeting 
religion) 
74% 
Winkler win rate for speech claims 22% 
Our findings do not demonstrate a dramatic drop in government win 
rates post Hobby Lobby. The data does not address relevant primary behav-
iors, such as the choice of government officials not to adopt or enforce cer-
tain laws.278 But our findings do shed light on how judges continue to en-
force strict scrutiny under RFRA post Hobby Lobby. More time and data are 
necessary to draw more concrete conclusions. 
2. Targeted Comparative Searches Findings 
In our targeted searches to assess volume of religious versus speech 
cases, we began by looking at volume in the three years since Hobby Lob-
by.279 In our findings, the number of speech and expressive cases that the 
searches returned generally dwarfed the number of free exercise cases in 
similar search results. Under each search result, speech cases outnumbered 
religious claims at a ratio of anywhere from 3:1 to 6:1. 
These findings are consistent with Professor Winkler’s findings, where 
the volume of speech-based claims was notably greater than the volume of 
religious claims. Specifically, Winkler found that speech claims constituted 
by far the largest category of strict scrutiny cases—222 of 459.280 There 
were thirty-three additional association cases, totaling 255 expressive cas-
es.281 In contrast, religious claims in Professor Winkler’s database account-
ed for merely seventy-three of the 459 claims.282 
Table 2 283 
 
Speech and  
Expressive Cases 
Religious  
Exercise Cases 
Ratio 
                                                                                                                           
 278 Notably, under the new Trump administration, the Attorney General recently issued guid-
ance that is much more protective of religious exercise under RFRA, and will likely result in much 
less agency action that is hostile towards religious exercise under this administration. See general-
ly Memorandum from Jeffrey Sessions, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for All Executive 
Departments and Agencies (Oct. 6, 2017). That sort of primary behavior is not measured by our 
RFRA case survey. 
 279 The date range filter used for all of these searches was July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2017. 
 280 Winkler, supra note 245, at 844–45. 
 281 Id. at 815. 
 282 Id. 
 283 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-5/barclay-rienzi-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD43-EGQR]. 
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Search of rele-
vant Westlaw 
key number 
1,796 305 6:1 
Search of rele-
vant term at 
least four times 
1,274 333 4:1 
Search in 
Westlaw sum-
mary of case 
639 188 3:1 
Winkler results 222 73 3:1 
When analyzing the trends of the Westlaw key number cases over 
time, our findings are not consistent with the allegation that religious claims 
are undergoing a dramatic expansion, particularly as compared to speech 
cases. Table 3 illustrates both types of Westlaw key number cases tracked in 
absolute terms over time.284 
Table 3 285 
 
Table 4 illustrates both types of Westlaw key number cases tracked as 
a percentage of all reported cases over time. The percentage of religious 
cases appears to have stayed fairly constant over the years. 
   
                                                                                                                           
 284 See infra note 285 and accompanying graphic. 
 285 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-5/barclay-rienzi-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD43-EGQR]. 
The underlying data set is available at 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1vbW_8E7orAkidtxcNAtQHy3s60k8TVx
LLOkiKGgpe_8/edit#gid=878012463 (request permission to view from author). 
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Perhaps most interesting is that if we hone in on the years immediately 
preceding Hobby Lobby and then immediately following that court decision, 
a fitted line graph in Table 5 illustrates that the slope of religion cases as a 
percentage of the reported caseload appears to be slightly decreasing. 
Table 5 287 
 
3. Spaeth Database Findings 
According to the Spaeth database from 1946 to 2016, there were a total 
of 461 First Amendment cases, and of these 378 dealt with speech or asso-
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ciation issues. The government was coded as a party in 344 of these cases. 
In contrast, during the same period of time there were only thirty-two free 
exercise cases (thirty-five with three RFRA cases included).288 The govern-
ment was coded as a party in twenty-nine of these cases.289 Thus, the 
speech-based claims outnumbered religious claims by a ratio of more than 
10:1. Overall, across the last seven decades, the court ruled in favor of the 
government in forty-one percent of the free speech and association cases in 
which it was a party. In contrast, the court ruled in favor of the government 
at the higher rate of forty-five percent of the twenty-nine free exercise cases 
in which the government was a party. In other words, the government is less 
likely to win in the context of speech and association cases than in religious 
exercise cases. But this difference is not substantial, and likely not statisti-
cally significant at the Supreme Court level. These findings are interesting 
in that they indicate that a far greater number of speech-based cases than 
religious cases are meritorious enough to percolate to the Supreme Court. 
Table 6 290 
Supreme Court Cases 
Speech and Associa-
tion Cases 
Religious Exercise 
Cases 
Number brought between 
1946 and 2016 
344 29 
Government win rate 41% 45% 
In sum, our findings are consistent with the conclusion that speech 
cases are much more pervasive than religious cases. Additionally, our find-
ings are not consistent with the notion that religious objections are dramati-
cally increasing in volume, or are much more likely to prompt a court to 
strike down government action under RFRA after Hobby Lobby. Compared 
to the work by Professor Winkler, Hobby Lobby does not appear to have 
significantly changed the government’s win rate. 
C. Jurisprudential Explanation for Empirical Findings 
The legal constraints on religious exercise claims may help explain 
why religious exemption requests are not as voluminous or as successful as 
critics fear. Although some scholars critique religious claims because truth 
                                                                                                                           
 288 Modern Database: 2017 Release 01, supra note 262. 
 289 Of these cases, twenty-six were constitutional free exercise cases and three were RFRA 
cases. 
 290 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-5/barclay-rienzi-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD43-EGQR]. 
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claims about such beliefs are “insulated from ordinary standards of evi-
dence,”291 the same could be said of truth claims implicated by other First 
Amendment rights. What standard of evidence could be said to apply, for 
instance, to the truth claims of pornography, nearly nude dancing, videos of 
animals being crushed, flag burning, or swastikas? Yet all of those are ex-
amples of speech objections that require the most heightened scrutiny our 
constitutional law offers.292 We often protect speech based on a speaker’s 
subjective belief that a law impacts their expression, even though most oth-
ers may not view the law as touching on expression at all.293 For example, 
most drivers who had to attach a license plate with a state motto likely did 
not feel like they were being compelled to “say” anything, but the appellees 
in Wooley v. Maynard subjectively felt otherwise, which was why they could 
raise a successful as-applied challenge.294 As the Supreme Court has noted 
elsewhere, “[a] person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and 
what is one man’s comfort and inspiration is another’s jest and scorn.”295 
We don’t even require speech to be sincere. We would give heightened 
protection to speech even if the speaker didn’t believe what he or she was 
saying, but still wanted to say it. Indeed, in New York Times v. Sullivan the 
Court protected speech that was not true.296 In contrast, a religious objector 
must prove her beliefs are sincere to receive protection. And sincerity acts 
as a significant gatekeeper to religious objectors receiving protection. 
For example, in a criminal drug trafficking case, an Arizona couple at-
tempted to raise drug money through its operation called the “Church of 
Cognizance,” founded on the teaching that marijuana is both a deity and 
sacrament.297 After the Border Patrol busted their “backpack runners” from 
Mexico, the couple argued that their drug-running was part of their church’s 
religious activities and thus legally protected by RFRA. In an opinion writ-
ten by then-Judge Gorsuch, the Tenth Circuit held that the couple’s religious 
beliefs were not sincere—a threshold determination in every religious liber-
ty case—and that the “church” was a mere front for a drug operation. The 
court explained that religious liberty laws do not “offer refuge to canny op-
                                                                                                                           
 291 LEITER, supra note 64, at 34; see also LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 55, at 27 (arguing that 
“[i]f the government cannot evaluate the significance of a particular religious practice within a 
believer’s faith, it will effectively lack the ability to identify—in a principled way—meritorious 
claims for accommodation”). 
 292 See, e.g., Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43–44 (1977) (hold-
ing that because there were First Amendment implications, they must “provide strict procedural 
safeguards”). 
 293 See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 132, at 160 (critiquing the way speech doctrine depends on 
the “subjective intensity of the speaker’s reaction” to the law’s requirement). 
 294 430 U.S. 705, 707–08, 717 (1972). 
 295 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632–33 (1943). 
 296 376 U.S. 254, 257–59, 264 (1964). 
 297 United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 718 (10th Cir. 2010). 
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erators who seek through subterfuge to avoid laws they’d prefer to ignore,” 
such as “those who set up ‘churches’ as cover for illegal drug distribution 
operations.”298 
Further, the belief at issue must be “genuinely ‘religious’” to receive 
protection.299 “[P]hilosophical and personal rather than religious” beliefs are 
not enough.300 In Cavanaugh v. Bartelt, for example, a district court deter-
mined that the satirical adherence to the “doctrine of the Flying Spaghetti 
Monster” did not constitute a religious belief qualifying for First Amend-
ment or RLUIPA protection.301 Instead, the court explained that this creed 
was “a parody, intended to advance an argument about science, the evolu-
tion of life, and the place of religion in public education.”302 Thus, the plain-
tiff was unable to prove that his religious exercise was burdened.303 
The very existence of these threshold requirements in the religious ex-
ercise realm also surely shapes the type of cases that litigants are willing to 
bring, as they assess whether their practice is really religious and based on a 
belief that they can prove is both sincerely held and actually burdened by 
the government action. In this manner, religious exercise claims are con-
strained by doctrine in ways that other constitutional claims are not. These 
constraints provide at least one explanation for why the volume of religious 
exercise cases is so much lower than speech and association cases. 
IV. THE ANOMALOUS MAJORITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE OF SMITH 
The case studies and empirical analysis above indicate that as-applied 
challenges are praised elsewhere in constitutional jurisprudence (particular-
ly the speech context), but uniquely maligned in the free exercise context 
without justification. What, then, accounts for this disparate treatment of 
two very similar304 types of constitutional challenges? One clue may come 
from analyzing the majoritarian jurisprudential foundation on which Em-
ployment Division v. Smith relies, and that has been soundly rejected in the 
speech context. 
                                                                                                                           
 298 Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 54 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Quaintance, 608 F.3d at 
720–23). 
 299 Cavanaugh v. Bartelt, 178 F. Supp. 3d 819, 829 (D. Neb. 2016), aff’d, No. 16-2105 (8th 
Cir. Sept. 7, 2016). 
 300 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972). 
 301 178 F. Supp. 3d at 825, 828–29. 
 302 Id. at 824. 
 303 Id. at 834. 
 304 The Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of 
conscience and worship that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment 
. . . .” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992) (emphasis added). 
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A. Majoritarian Reasoning of Gobitis Overruled by  
Barnette in the Speech Context 
In 1935, during an elementary school’s daily pledge of allegiance cer-
emony, a ten-year-old fifth grader named William Gobitis refused to salute 
the flag. This daily patriotic ritual at the time involved a “stiff-arm” salute 
that some complained looked very similar to the one Hitler required in Nazi 
Germany.305 Some religious leaders had even given speeches denouncing 
participation in the “Heil Hitler” salute.306 When William declined to partic-
ipate, his teacher tried to force his arm up, but William held it in his pocket 
and successfully resisted. The next day, William’s eleven-year-old sister, 
Lillian, did the same thing. She told her teacher, “I can’t salute the flag an-
ymore. The Bible says at Exodus chapter 20 that we can’t have any other 
gods before Jehovah God.” The teacher hugged Lillian and called her a 
“dear girl.”307 
The classmates of William and Lillian Gobitis were first astonished 
and then disgusted with what they viewed as an unforgivable lack of patri-
otism. They would chant “[h]ere comes Jehovah” at the children and show-
er them with pebbles on their way to school every day. The Gobitis parents 
supported the consciences of their children, and in fact this Jehovah’s Wit-
ness family was part of a national religious movement objecting to the flag 
salute. But they too were shunned by their community: their family-owned 
grocery store was threatened with a mob attack and they were subjected to a 
boycott. After the children were expelled from school, the family turned to 
the courts.308 
This legal dispute led to Minersville School District v. Gobitis, one of 
the primary cases on which the Smith decision relied.309 In this case, the 
Gobitis family challenged the generally applicable public-school require-
ment that students either perform a salute to the national flag as part of a 
daily ceremony or face expulsion.310 In this case, no one disputed the sin-
                                                                                                                           
 305 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 627. 
 306 NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICES 179 (2010). 
 307 Id. at 179–80; see also SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELI-
GIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 33–40, 53–54 (2000) (ex-
plaining the tenacity of the Jehovah Witnesses’ faith that led to Minersville School District v. 
Gobitis); Richard Danzig, Justice Frankfurter’s Opinions in the Flag Salute Cases: Blending 
Logic and Psychologic in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 36 STAN. L. REV. 675, 677–78 (1984) 
(analyzing Justice Frankfurter’s opinion on the flag saluting cases based on a legal and psycholog-
ical understanding); Lillian Gobitis, The Courage to Put God First, AWAKE!, July 22, 1993, at 
12–15 (recalling what led up to her Supreme Court case). 
 308 FELDMAN, supra note 306, at 179–80. 
 309 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting Minersville 
Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594–95 (1940), overruled by Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624). 
 310 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 591. 
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cere religious objections the Gobitis children had to participating in this 
ceremony.311 
There was no question in the Gobitis Court’s eyes that the generally 
applicable flag salute requirement was constitutional. The Court stated: 
“[t]hat the flag-salute is an allowable portion of a school program for those 
who do not invoke conscientious scruples is surely not debatable.”312 Ra-
ther, the issue was “[w]hen does the constitutional guarantee [of religious 
liberty] compel exemption from doing what society thinks necessary for the 
promotion of some great common end, or from a penalty for conduct which 
appears dangerous to the general good?”313 Another way to ask the same 
question is whether an as-applied challenge to the generally applicable flag 
salute requirement should be upheld for the Jehovah’s Witness children, 
providing a “religious exemption from a law that bound everybody.”314 
The Court rejected this as-applied challenge, arguing that “[t]he religious 
liberty that the Constitution protects has never excluded legislation of general 
scope not directed against doctrinal loyalties of particular sects.”315 The Court 
also cited to Reynolds v. United States, observing that “[c]onscientious 
scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, 
relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the 
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.”316 Thus, the Court refused to 
provide what it characterized as “exceptional immunity . . . to dissidents,” 
and the Jehovah’s Witness children were forced to either salute the flag or 
be expelled from school.317 The Court in Gobitis also made clear that its 
reasoning was not limited to free exercise, but extended to a constitutional 
challenge based on speech rights as well.318 
The Court primarily relied on the theory of judicial restraint developed 
by Justice Felix Frankfurter, arguing that courts must defer to the will of the 
majority, and that it would be an “arbitrary” exercise of power undermining 
the strength of the government to set such legislative determinations 
aside.319 In the theory set forth by Frankfurter, “the judiciary was supposed 
to defer to reasonable judgments made by legislators, not overturn them 
because it disagreed with their substance.”320 
                                                                                                                           
 311 Id. at 592–93. 
 312 Id. at 599. 
 313 Id. at 593. 
 314 FELDMAN, supra note 306, at 182. 
 315 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594. 
 316 Id. at 594–95. 
 317 Id. at 591, 599–600. 
 318 Id. at 595 (holding that “[n]or does the freedom of speech assured by Due Process move in 
a more absolute circle of immunity than that enjoyed by religious freedom”). 
 319 Id. at 596; FELDMAN, supra note 306, at 181–82. 
 320 FELDMAN, supra note 306, at 182. 
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Justice Harlan Stone authored a vigorous dissent, arguing that simply 
deferring to the general rules passed by a legislature amounted to “no less 
than the surrender of the constitutional protection of the liberty of small 
minorities to the popular will.”321 Stone relied on his famous footnote four 
analysis in the previous case of United States v. Carolene Products Co., and 
“pointed to the importance of a searching judicial inquiry into the legisla-
tive judgment in situations where prejudice against discrete and insular mi-
norities may tend to curtail the operation of those political processes ordi-
narily to be relied on to protect minorities.”322 Legislation that operated “to 
repress the religious freedom of small minorities, . . . must at least be sub-
ject to the same judicial scrutiny as legislation which we have recently held 
to infringe the constitutional liberty of . . . racial minorities,” Stone ar-
gued.323 This was because, in his view, the “Constitution expresses more 
than the conviction of the people that democratic processes must be pre-
served at all costs.”324 
Just three years later, in the Barnette decision (announced on Flag 
Day), Justice Stone’s reasoning won the day and the Court overruled Gobi-
tis—though only speaking clearly in terms of First Amendment expressive 
rights.325 Specifically, the Court upheld an injunction “restrain[ing] en-
forcement as to the plaintiffs and those of that class” based on the “limiting 
principles of the First Amendment.”326 In some of the most famous lines 
from First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court waxed eloquent 
about the grave risk of “coerc[ing] uniformity” in support of majoritarian 
sentiment.327 “Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find 
themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion 
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”328 The Court thus concluded 
that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that 
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess 
by word or act their faith therein.”329  
                                                                                                                           
 321 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 606 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
 322 Id. (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). 
 323 Id. at 607. 
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 325 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 326 Id. at 630, 639. 
 327 Id. at 640. 
 328 Id. at 641. 
 329 Id. at 642 (emphasis added). The foundational principle has spawned much of our free 
speech jurisprudence. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000) 
(holding that “[t]he history of the law of free expression is one of vindication in cases involving 
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397, 414 (1989) (holding that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it 
is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the 
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Some scholars have argued that Barnette was not a “religious exemp-
tion case,” and was instead a case about “bar[ring] enforcement of the man-
datory salute statute . . . .”330 To be sure, the Court in Barnette avoided the 
use of typical religious exemption language. But this was not a case about 
whether the pledge of allegiance was being stricken (or even partially 
stricken) for facial invalidity, or whether schools were prohibited from hold-
ing flag salute ceremonies (or aspects of the ceremonies) as a general mat-
ter. In fact, those sorts of lawsuits would come, but much later.331 Barnette 
was a case in which the Court “restrained enforcement” of an otherwise 
valid policy “as to the plaintiffs and those of that class.”332 To qualify for 
this exemption, Plaintiffs (and others in the future who were similarly situ-
ated), were being protected based on their First Amendment objection to an 
otherwise valid exercise of government authority. That targeted invalidation 
of government action is similar to what we think of as an as-applied chal-
lenge in other contexts.  
Regardless of the nuances of the type of remedy offered in this case, 
what is clear is that Barnette instituted a rule of law that was distinctly pro-
tective of minority rights against majoritarian rules, and which remains 
foundational law in speech jurisprudence.333 
B. Gobitis Resurrected by Smith in the Free Exercise Context 
Though Gobitis remains bad law in the realm of free speech law, it was 
resurrected as one of the primary jurisprudential pillars of reasoning in 
Smith. The Smith Court quoted the following passage from Gobitis: 
[c]onscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long strug-
gle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience 
to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of reli-
gious beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which 
                                                                                                                           
idea itself offensive or disagreeable”); see also Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment 
Right to Free Expression: From the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 774 (2008) (noting that “[r]epudiation of governmentally-mandated or-
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 330 LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 55, at 187. 
 331 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 8, 10 (2004). 
 332 319 U.S. at 630. 
 333 See, e.g., Heffernan v. Paterson, N.J., 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1417 (2016) (citing Barnette as 
setting forth the First Amendment’s “basic constitutional requirement”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605–06 (2015) (quoting Barnette for the principle that the purpose of the consti-
tution “was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be 
applied by the courts”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not re-
lieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities.334 
The Court relied on this reasoning to conclude that “an individual’s reli-
gious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid 
law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”335 The preceden-
tial value of Smith’s reliance on Gobitis is dubious. As Professor Michael 
McConnell put it, “[r]elying on Gobitis without mentioning Barnette is like 
relying on Plessy v. Ferguson without mentioning Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation.”336 
Four justices recognized the problem with relying on Gobitis. Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor, for example, relied in her concurrence instead on the 
reasoning of Barnette, quoting the following passage: 
[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain 
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish 
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to 
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of 
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be 
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.337 
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TION? (2001) (arguing that the Constitution ultimately upholds antidemocratic ideals); SANFORD 
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In a nutshell, one of the principles upon which Smith relies is that “the 
true course of judicial duty” is to “keep[] their hands off” the majoritarian 
decisions of “legislative power,” as an exercise of judicial self-restraint.338 
In contrast, the jurisprudence Smith overruled stands for the proposition that 
religious exemptions “protect the rights of those whose religious practices 
are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility” because 
“[t]he history of . . . free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh 
impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious 
groups.”339 
As the Supreme Court previously noted, the diversity of religious be-
liefs in our nation should weigh in favor of us providing more protection—
not less. 
 In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, 
sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may 
seem the rankest error to his neighbor . . . . [I]n spite of the prob-
ability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long 
view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the 
part of the citizens of a democracy. 
 The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that under their 
shield many types of life, character, opinion and belief can devel-
op unmolested and unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more 
necessary than in our own country for a people composed of 
many races and of many creeds.340 
As-applied challenges to generally applicable laws allow a society as 
diverse as ours to accommodate the “sharp differences [that] arise” in be-
liefs or preferences while still allowing the democratically-enacted rules of 
law to continue to operate for the public good. The other alternative is to 
disregard the minority views that are not protected by our political process. 
Regardless of one’s ultimate views on the merits of a countermajoritar-
ian approach, the divergent precedents of Gobitis and Barnette provide one 
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explanation for the disfavored treatment of religious exemptions. In Gobitis, 
the Court determined that judicial restraint required it to simply defer to the 
will of the majority, which required school children to perform a stiff-arm 
flag salute against their conscience because the majority thought they 
should. Just three years later, in the Barnette decision, the Court overruled 
its Gobitis holding in the context of expressive rights, explaining that the 
“very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of ma-
jorities.”341 Barnette thus instituted a rule of law that was distinctly protec-
tive of minority rights, and that remains foundational jurisprudence in the 
context of speech rights. In contrast, this Article demonstrates how modern 
religious exercise law has (mistakenly) resurrected the deferential and ma-
joritarian reasoning of Gobitis, while asserting that requests to treat reli-
gious exercise like other First Amendment rights are somehow out-of-step 
with our constitutional traditions. 
For critics trying to evaluate which approach is better, the following 
question is instructive: Do we want to live in a society where the govern-
ment can force school children to salute flags, simply because the majority 
likes that idea at the time? If the answer is no, that worldview hearkens to 
the counter-majoritarian reasoning of Barnette. That same principle also 
underlies statutes like RFRA. To support instead a double standard that 
treats religious exercise as less deserving than any other First Amendment 
right, then, would be the true anomaly. 
CONCLUSION 
Viewing religious exemptions through the lens of as-applied challeng-
es makes clear that such exemptions are not anomalous at all. When re-
quests for individual religious exemptions are compared to as-applied chal-
lenges in other constitutional contexts, it turns out that providing religious 
exemptions from otherwise valid laws is both the most modest and the pre-
ferred method of adjudicating conflicts between individual rights and laws 
passed for the public good. 
The First Amendment cases surveyed in this Article indicate that reli-
gious as-applied challenges do not result in preferential treatment for reli-
gious objectors as a constitutional matter. Our new RFRA survey contradicts 
the notion that religious objections are much more likely to prompt a court to 
strike down government action under RFRA post-Hobby Lobby. Our findings 
also indicate that cases dealing with religious objections to laws are less vo-
luminous than other cases dealing with other expressive First Amendment 
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claims, and the religious cases do not appear to be undergoing a trend of dra-
matic growth. In fact, the trend appears to be a slight decrease in volume. 
Thus, through allowing as-applied challenges, religious exemption 
schemes like RFRA simply restore religious exercise rights to a similar level 
of protection already offered to other rights housed in the First Amendment 
and necessary for the protection of minority views in our pluralistic society. 
